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STUDENTS, POLICE, AND THE  
SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE 
JASON P. NANCE

 
ABSTRACT 
Since the terrible shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary School in 
Newtown, Connecticut, lawmakers and school officials continue to 
deliberate over new laws and policies to keep students safe, including 
putting more police officers in schools. Yet these decisionmakers have not 
given enough attention to the potential negative consequences that such 
laws and policies may have, such as creating a pathway from school to 
prison for many students. Traditionally, only educators, not law 
enforcement, handled certain lower-level offenses that students committed, 
such as fighting or making threats without using a weapon. Drawing on 
recent restricted data from the US Department of Education, this Article 
presents an original empirical analysis revealing that a police officer’s 
regular presence at a school is predictive of greater odds that school 
officials refer students to law enforcement for committing various offenses, 
including these lower-level offenses. This trend holds true even after 
controlling for: (1) state statutes that require schools to report certain 
incidents to law enforcement; (2) general levels of criminal activity and 
disorder that occur at schools; (3) neighborhood crime; and (4) other 
demographic variables. The consequences of involving students in the 
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criminal justice system are severe, especially for students of color, and 
may negatively affect the trajectory of students’ lives. Therefore, 
lawmakers and school officials should consider alternative methods to 
create safer learning environments.  
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Although the phrase “school-to-prison pipeline” has become “part 
of the national lexicon,” it has yet to enter the lexicon of our courts. 
. . . It is no doubt correct that early and positive intervention by 
family and educators will best realign [a student’s] errant behavior 
and most likely lead to a productive life. That should be the 
educational goal of our school system in dealing with [students]. It 
should be a societal goal.
1
 
INTRODUCTION 
On September 18, 2007, Pleajhai Mervin, a sixteen-year-old student, 
dropped some birthday cake on the school cafeteria floor.
2
 This seemingly 
small incident escalated quickly when Pleajhai and a security officer 
stationed at the high school became involved in a scuffle after Pleajhai 
failed to clean up the cake to the officer’s satisfaction.3 Another fourteen-
year-old student who was recording the incident also became involved in 
the scuffle when that student refused to hand over his camera to the 
officer.
4
 Then the fourteen-year-old student’s older sister became involved 
in the scuffle when she tried to intervene and help her brother.
5
 The police 
arrested all three students and booked them on suspicion of battery.
6
  
In October of 2015, a teacher called a police officer into the classroom 
to handle a student who was using a cell phone against school rules.
7
 Other 
students in the classroom captured what transpired next by video.
8
 After 
the student refused to leave the classroom, the police officer violently 
grabbed the student by the neck, flipped the student and her desk to the 
floor, forcibly dragged her across the classroom, and then arrested her.
9
 
 
 
1. Hawker v. Sandy City Corp., 774 F.3d 1243, 1246 (10th Cir. 2014) (Lucero, J., concurring) 
(quoting Lisa H. Thurau & Johanna Wald, Controlling Partners: When Law Enforcement Meets 
Discipline in Public Schools, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 977, 981 (2009)). 
2. Ann M. Simmons, High School Scuffle Exposes a Racial Rift, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2007), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/oct/11/local/me-palmdale11. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
 7.  Emma Brown, Police in Schools: Keeping Kids Safe, or Arresting Them for No Good 
Reason?, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/police-in-
schools-keeping-kids-safe-or-arresting-them-for-no-good-reason/2015/11/08/937ddfd0-816c-11e5-9a 
fb-0c971f713d0c_story.html. 
 8.  See id. 
 9.  See Valerie Bauerlein & Zusha Elinson, Role of School Police Officers Questioned, WALL 
ST. J. (Oct. 28, 2015, 8:22 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/role-of-school-police-officers-questioned-
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Involving law enforcement in disciplinary issues that educators once 
handled on their own is becoming an increasingly common feature of our 
public school system.
10
 The anecdotal evidence of police officers 
mishandling student disciplinary problems abounds. For example, police 
officers stationed at schools have arrested students for texting, passing gas 
in class, violating the school dress code, stealing two dollars from a 
classmate, bringing a cell phone to class, arriving late to school, or telling 
classmates waiting in the school lunch line that he would “get them” if 
they ate all of the potatoes.
11
 To be clear, these mishandlings are not 
limited only to high school and middle school students. In 2005, police 
arrested a five-year-old girl after she threw a temper tantrum when her 
teacher ended a mathematical counting exercise involving jelly beans.
12
 
Then in 2007, police arrested six-year-old Desre’e Watson for throwing a 
temper tantrum in an elementary school.
13
 The police had to place the 
handcuffs around Desre’e’s biceps as they escorted her to the police 
station because her wrists were too small.
14
  
 
 
1446076813; Josh Sanburn, Do Cops in Schools Do More Harm Than Good?, TIME (Oct. 29, 2015), 
http://time.com/4093517/south-carolina-school-police-ben-fields/.  
 10. See Hawker v. Sandy City Corp., 774 F.3d 1243, 1245 (10th Cir. 2014) (Lucero, J., 
concurring); CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 37–38 (2015) [hereinafter FERGUSON INVESTIGATION] (finding that the Ferguson, 
Missouri, Police Department treated “routine discipline issues as criminal matters”); see also Ben 
Brown, Understanding and Assessing School Police Officers: A Conceptual and Methodological 
Comment, 34 J. CRIM. JUST. 591, 591 (2006). 
 11. See SHAKTI BELWAY, S. POVERTY LAW CTR., ACCESS DENIED: NEW ORLEANS STUDENTS 
AND PARENTS IDENTIFY BARRIERS TO PUBLIC EDUCATION (2010) (describing various incidents where 
police mishandled student disciplinary issues); FERGUSON INVESTIGATION, supra note 10, at 37–38 
(describing incidents where police mishandled student disciplinary issues); Nancy A. Heitzeg, 
Criminalizing Education: Zero Tolerance Policies, Police in the Hallways, and the School to Prison 
Pipeline, in FROM EDUCATION TO INCARCERATION: DISMANTLING THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE 
11, 21–22 (Anthony J. Nocella II et al. eds., 2014) (describing various incidents where students were 
punished, and even arrested, for minor offenses); ELORA MUKHERJEE, N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 
CRIMINALIZING THE CLASSROOM: THE OVER-POLICING OF NEW YORK CITY SCHOOLS 6, 14 (2007), 
available at http://www.nyclu.org/pdfs/criminalizing_the_classroom_report.pdf (describing the arrests 
of students resulting from bringing cell phones to school and being late to class); Matthew T. Theriot, 
School Resource Officers and the Criminalization of Student Behavior, 37 J. CRIM. JUST. 280, 281 
(2009) (describing arrests for trivial offenses); Sharif Durhams, Tosa East Student Arrested, Fined for 
Repeated Texting, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Feb. 17, 2009), http://www.jsonline.com/news/ 
milwaukee/39711222.html; Student Arrested for ‘Passing Gas’ at Fla. School, NBCNEWS.COM (Nov. 
24, 2008, 9:47 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/27898395/ns/us_news-weird_news/t/student-arrested 
-passing-gas-fla-school/, archived at http://perma.cc/C59M-QCMY.  
 12. See Thomas C. Tobin, Video Shows Police Handcuffing 5-Year-Old, TAMPA BAY TIMES 
(Apr. 22, 2005), http://www.sptimes.com/2005/04/22/Southpinellas/Video_shows_police_ha.shtml, 
archived at http://perma.cc/87RY-ZK9J.  
 13. Bob Herbert, 6-Year-Olds Under Arrest, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2007), http://www.nytimes.co 
m/2007/04/09/opinion/09herbert.html?_r=0. 
 14. See id. 
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Students’ increased involvement with the justice system is part of a 
growing concern that many refer to as the “school-to-prison pipeline.”15 
The term “school-to-prison pipeline” (“Pipeline”) connotes the 
intersection of the K–12 public education system and law enforcement, 
and the trend of referring students directly to law enforcement for 
committing offenses at school or creating conditions that increase the 
probability of students eventually becoming incarcerated, such as 
suspending or expelling them.
16
 Although some may believe that arresting 
or incarcerating students for violating school rules may “scare them 
straight,” involving youth in the justice system normally does not achieve 
the desired reformative effect.
17
 Rather, the negative consequences that 
often occur instead are quite severe.
18
 Empirical studies demonstrate that 
 
 
 15. See, e.g., Christi Parsons, Obama Wants to Stop ‘School-to-Prison Pipeline’ for Minorities, 
L.A. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2014, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/politicsnow/la-pn-
obama-stop-school-prison-pipeline-20140210-story.html (discussing President Obama’s “plans to 
launch an initiative aimed at improving the lives of young black and Latino men” by stopping the 
school-to-prison pipeline); Press Release, Dick Durbin, U.S. Senator, Durbin Holds Hearing on Ending 
the School-to-Prison Pipeline (Dec. 12, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/CB6V-3TXH (explaining 
Senator Durbin’s position in favor of “reforms to better discipline our students without forcing them 
out of the classroom and into a courtroom”); Video Highlights: ABA Seeks Solutions for School-to-
Prison Pipeline Problem, ABA (Feb. 11, 2014, 3:15 PM), http://www.americanbar.org/news/ 
abanews/aba-news-archives/2014/02/video_highlightsab.html (featuring judges, educators, activists, 
and lawyers discussing the school-to-prison pipeline at an American Bar Association town hall forum). 
 16. See Hawker v. Sandy City Corp., 774 F.3d 1243, 1245 (10th Cir. 2014) (Lucero, J., 
concurring) (quoting Jason P. Nance, School Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, 2014 WIS. L. 
REV. 79, 83); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER ON THE 
NONDISCRIMINATORY ADMINISTRATION OF SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 4 (2014), available at 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201401-title-vi.pdf [hereinafter DEAR 
COLLEAGUE LETTER]. Conditions increasing the probability that a student will be arrested are broad 
and might include depriving students of needed resources to enhance their educational opportunities. 
See CATHERINE Y. KIM ET AL., THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE: STRUCTURING LEGAL REFORM 1 
(2010); see also Jason P. Nance, Dismantling the School-to-Prison Pipeline: Tools for Change, 48 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2016), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2 
671447 [hereinafter Nance, Dismantling the School-to-Prison Pipeline].  
 17. See generally JAMES O. FINCKENAUER & PATRICIA W. GAVIN, SCARED STRAIGHT: THE 
PANACEA PHENOMENON REVISITED (1999); JAMES O. FINCKENAUER, SCARED STRAIGHT! AND THE 
PANACEA PHENOMENON (1982) (debunking the myth that imposing severe consequences can by itself 
deter criminal behavior); see also ANTHONY PETROSINO ET AL., THE CAMPBELL COLLABORATION, 
FORMAL SYSTEM PROCESSING OF JUVENILES: EFFECTS ON DELINQUENCY 6 (2010) (suggesting that 
incarcerating a youth does not effectively deter criminal behavior; rather, it increases future 
involvement in the justice system); Anne M. Hobbs et al., Assessing Youth Early in the Juvenile 
Justice System, 3 J. JUV. JUST. 80, 81 (2013) (“[O]fficial processing of a juvenile law violation may be 
the least effective means of rehabilitating juvenile offenders.”). 
 18. See DON BEZRUKI ET AL., WIS. LEGISLATIVE AUDIT BUREAU, REP. NO. 99-13, SECURE 
JUVENILE DETENTION: AN EVALUATION 4 (1999) (determining that detaining youth does not reduce 
the likelihood of recidivism); BARRY HOLMAN & JASON ZIEDENBERG, JUSTICE POLICY INST., THE 
DANGERS OF DETENTION: THE IMPACT OF INCARCERATING YOUTH IN DETENTION AND OTHER 
SECURE FACILITIES 4 (2006) (showing that incarcerating youth can lead to increased future 
involvement in the justice system). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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arresting a student substantially reduces the odds that the student will 
graduate from high school, especially if that student appears in court.
19
 It 
also decreases the odds that a student will succeed academically and have 
future stable employment opportunities.
20
 Worse, it increases the 
likelihood of that student’s future involvement in the criminal justice 
system.
21
 The consequences associated with incarceration are even more 
severe.
22
 Empirical research shows that incarcerating youth reinforces 
violent attitudes and behaviors;
23
 limits future educational, housing, 
employment, and military opportunities;
24
 deteriorates their mental 
health;
25
 and increases the likelihood of their future involvement in the 
justice system.
26
  
Furthermore, these negative trends do not impact all racial groups 
equally. Abundant empirical evidence demonstrates that students of color 
are disproportionately represented throughout every stage of the Pipeline. 
For example, school administrators and teachers discipline minority 
students more often and more severely than white students for committing 
 
 
 19. See ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, EDUCATION ON LOCKDOWN: THE SCHOOLHOUSE TO 
JAILHOUSE TRACK 12 (2005), available at http://b.3cdn.net/ advancement/5351180e24cb166d02 
_mlbrqgxlh.pdf [hereinafter EDUCATION ON LOCKDOWN]; KIM ET AL., supra note 16, at 113; Gary 
Sweeten, Who Will Graduate? Disruption of High School Education by Arrest and Court Involvement, 
23 JUST. Q. 462, 473, 478–79 (2006). 
 20. See KIM ET AL., supra note 16, at 113. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Notably, there are calls to reform the juvenile justice system to respond better to the needs of 
youth and help them to avoid future involvement in the justice system. See generally A NEW JUVENILE 
JUSTICE SYSTEM: TOTAL REFORM FOR A BROKEN SYSTEM (Nancy E. Dowd ed., 2015) [hereinafter 
TOTAL REFORM FOR A BROKEN SYSTEM]. 
 23. Mark J. Van Ryzin & Thomas J. Dishion, From Antisocial Behavior to Violence: A Model 
for the Amplifying Role of Coercive Joining in Adolescent Friendships, 54 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & 
PSYCHIATRY 661, 661 (2013) (finding that coercive friendships at age 16–17 “predicted early-
adulthood violent behavior”); Hobbs et al., supra note 17, at 81. 
 24. See EDUCATION ON LOCKDOWN, supra note 19, at 12; FLA. STATE CONFERENCE NAACP ET 
AL., ARRESTING DEVELOPMENT: ADDRESSING THE SCHOOL DISCIPLINE CRISIS IN FLORIDA 17 (2006), 
available at http://b.3cdn.net/advancement/e36d17097615e7c612_bbm6vub0w.pdf [hereinafter 
ARRESTING DEVELOPMENT]; HOLMAN & ZIEDENBERG, supra note 18; Hobbs et al., supra note 17, at 
81. 
 25. HOLMAN & ZIEDENBERG, supra note 18, at 8; Christopher B. Forrest et al., The Health 
Profile of Incarcerated Male Youths, 105 PEDIATRICS 286, 288–89 (2000) (finding that incarcerated 
males suffered from significant mental health concerns); Javad H. Kashani et al., Depression Among 
Incarcerated Delinquents, 3 PSYCHIATRY RES. 185, 189–90 (1980) (demonstrating that depression 
increased among incarcerated youth). 
 26. See BEZRUKI ET AL., supra note 18, at 4; HOLMAN & ZIEDENBERG, supra note 18, at 4; Brent 
B. Benda & Connie L. Tollett, A Study of Recidivism of Serious and Persistent Offenders Among 
Adolescents, 27 J. CRIM. JUST. 111, 119–20 (1999) (demonstrating that prior incarceration was a 
stronger predictor of recidivism than being neglected or abused by parents, gang membership, being 
with peers at the time the offense was committed, or carrying a weapon). 
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similar offenses,
27
 and children of color have higher arrest and conviction 
rates when they become involved with law enforcement and the justice 
system.
28
 
These appalling trends certainly have not gone unnoticed, and there 
have been several calls for reform. For example, in March of 2012, 
prominent education and judicial leaders from around the country gathered 
at a conference to discuss ending the Pipeline.
29
 That summit sparked 
several other gatherings.
30
 The US Department of Education’s Office for 
Civil Rights (“OCR”) and the US Department of Justice have conducted 
several compliance reviews to ensure that schools do not discriminate on 
the basis of race by disciplining minorities more frequently or harshly than 
similarly-situated white students.
31
 In addition, in December of 2012, the 
 
 
 27. See, e.g., Theresa Glennon, Looking for Air: Excavating Destructive Educational and Racial 
Policies to Build Successful School Communities, in JUSTICE FOR KIDS: KEEPING KIDS OUT OF THE 
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 107, 110–11 (Nancy E. Dowd ed., 2011) [hereinafter JUSTICE FOR KIDS] 
(citing studies that demonstrate that minority students are disciplined disproportionately); Russell J. 
Skiba et al., African American Disproportionality in School Discipline: The Divide Between Best 
Evidence and Legal Remedy, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1071, 1086–89 (2010) (describing the empirical 
evidence of racial disproportionality of school discipline).  
 28. See JAMES BELL & LAURA JOHN RIDOLFI, W. HAYWOOD BURNS INST., ADORATION OF THE 
QUESTION: REFLECTIONS ON THE FAILURE TO REDUCE RACIAL & ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN THE 
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 8 (2008) (“Two-thirds of all youth in public detention facilities today are 
youth of color—though they represent only 39 percent of the overall youth population—who are still 
treated more harshly even when charged with the same offense as White youth.”); AMANDA 
PETTERUTI, JUSTICE POLICY INST., EDUCATION UNDER ARREST: THE CASE AGAINST POLICE IN 
SCHOOLS 21 (2011), available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/ 
educationunderarrest_fullreport.pdf [hereinafter EDUCATION UNDER ARREST] (citing data); Nancy E. 
Dowd, What Men?: The Essentialist Error of the “End of Men,” 93 B.U. L. REV. 1205, 1222–23 
(2013) (observing that disproportionate minority confinement “is present throughout the system, 
reflected in disparate and harsher treatment, as well as disproportionate and unnecessary entry and 
penetration into the juvenile justice system,” and “is not due to differential offending”); Jason P. 
Nance & Paul E. Madsen, An Empirical Analysis of Diversity in the Legal Profession, 47 CONN. L. 
REV. 271, 293–94 (2014) (citing empirical evidence of higher conviction rates for minorities for 
similar offenses); Mark Soler et al., Juvenile Justice: Lessons for a New Era, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY 
L. & POL’Y 483, 531–32 (2009) (observing that African-American youth were “nine times as likely to 
be incarcerated” as white youth charged for the same offense when both had no prior admissions). 
 29. See N.Y. State Permanent Judicial Comm’n on Justice for Children, School-Justice 
Partnership: Keeping Kids in School & Out of Court, NYCOURTS.GOV, archived at 
https//perma.cc/NQ56-L4NC (last updated Jan. 28, 2015). 
 30. See, e.g., id.; Keeping Kids in School and Out of Court Summit, CAL. COURTS, 
http://www.courts.ca.gov/23902.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2016). 
 31. See Recent Resolutions, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/investigations/index.html#title6rev (last visited Jan. 5, 
2016), archived at http://perma.cc/LY8A-V3VE (listing numerous compliance reviews with school 
districts); Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, Justice Department Files Consent 
Decree to Prevent and Address Racial Discrimination in Student Discipline in Meridian, Miss. (Mar. 
22, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/ N6UD-RSVJ (reporting that the Justice Department entered 
into a consent decree with the Meridian Public School District to prevent and address racial 
discrimination in disciplinary actions against students). The OCR also recently issued two influential 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights and 
Human Rights held a hearing to discuss ending the Pipeline for the first 
time in our nation’s history.32  
Nevertheless, only two days after that historic US congressional 
hearing, a tragic event took place that has since served as a catalyst for 
new laws and practices that may exacerbate these negative trends. 
Specifically, on December 14, 2012, Adam Lanza brutally massacred 
twenty children and six educators at Sandy Hook Elementary School in 
Newtown, Connecticut, provoking deep feelings of sadness, anger, and 
fear.
33
 In response to this tragedy, many Americans demanded that 
lawmakers and school officials intensify school security measures and 
increase the presence of law enforcement officers in our nation’s 
schools.
34
 While some criticized those demands,
35
 the federal government 
and several state legislatures passed laws that provided more money to 
hire law enforcement officers and install greater security measures in 
schools.
36
 Lawmakers enacted such laws without adequately researching 
 
 
Dear Colleague Letters that relate to the Pipeline. The first letter addresses nondiscriminatory 
administration of school discipline. See DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 16. The second letter 
addresses the problem of unequal access to educational resources. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER: RESOURCE COMPARABILITY (2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/QFF9-UHLQ. 
 32. See Ending the School-to-Prison Pipeline: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, 
Civil Rights and Human Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2012), available at 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg86166/pdf/CHRG-112shrg86166.pdf; Susan Ferriss, 
‘School to Prison Pipeline’ Hit on Capitol Hill, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (May 19, 2014, 12:19 PM), 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/12/13/11921/school-prison-pipeline-hit-capitol-hill.  
 33. See, e.g., Tom Raum & Jennifer Agiesta, Poll: Americans Angrier About Sandy Hook than 
9/11 Attacks, CNSNEWS.COM (Jan. 16, 2013, 8:32 PM), http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/poll-
americans-angrier-about-sandy-hook-shooting-911-attacks, archived at http://perma.cc/D27Y-VU25 
(reporting the anger Americans felt over the Newtown shootings); Jeanette Rundquist, Surprise 
Security Drills Coming to N.J. Schools, NJ.COM (Jan. 16, 2013, 9:07 PM), http://www.nj.com/ 
news/index.ssf/2013/01/surprise_school_security_drills.html, archived at http://perma.cc/D3PQ-YP9T 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (“The tragedy in Connecticut was the school community’s 9/11. 
This has touched the very soul of the country, no less the school community . . . .”). 
 34. See, e.g., Remarks from the NRA Press Conference on Sandy Hook Shooting, Delivered on 
Dec. 21, 2012 (Transcript), WASH. POST (Dec. 21, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics 
/remarks-from-the-nra-press-conference-on-sandy-hook-school-shooting-delivered-on-dec-21-2012-tra 
nscript/2012/12/21/bd1841fe-4b88-11e2-a6a6-aabac85e8036_story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
CS4C-MPGL (calling for all schools to be staffed with armed guards).  
 35. See, e.g., Aaron Kupchik et al., The Aftermath of Newtown: More of the Same, 55 BRIT. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 1115 (2015) (describing criticisms launched at the NRA’s suggestion to staff every 
school with an armed guard); Quinn: NRA Plan to Avoid Mass-Shootings Is ‘Stupid, Asinine,’ CBS 
NEW YORK (Dec. 22, 2012, 1:22 PM), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2012/12/22/quinn-nra-plan-to-
avoid-mass-shootings-is-stupid-asinine/, archived at http://perma.cc/8Y3C-J3B2.  
 36. See infra Part III. 
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whether these expensive measures actually would improve school safety.
37
 
And more importantly, they did not give adequate attention to the potential 
negative consequences of using these strict measures, including whether 
these measures would put more students on a pathway from school to 
prison.  
This Article illuminates this important discussion in at least two ways. 
First, drawing on a large, national, restricted-access dataset recently 
released by the US Department of Education, this Article presents an 
original empirical analysis of sensitive data relating to conditions under 
which schools refer students to law enforcement for various offenses that 
occur on school grounds. The empirical analysis reveals that, even after 
controlling for (1) state statutes that require schools to report certain 
incidents to law enforcement, (2) general levels of criminal activity and 
disorder that occur at the school, (3) neighborhood crime, and (4) other 
demographic variables, a police officer’s regular presence at a school is 
predictive of greater odds that school officials refer students to law 
enforcement for various offenses, including seemingly minor offenses.
38
 
This finding has serious implications as lawmakers and school officials 
continue to deliberate over whether to use their limited resources to hire 
more law enforcement officers to patrol school grounds.  
Second, this Article urges lawmakers and school officials to use their 
resources to adopt alternative measures to promote school safety instead of 
resorting to measures that rely on coercion, punishment, and fear. This is 
especially important when such measures tend to push students out of 
school and into the juvenile justice system, which can have devastating, 
long-lasting consequences on the lives of students.
39
 A growing body of 
research suggests that programs promoting a strong sense of community 
and collective responsibility enhance school safety much more effectively 
than police officers and other strict security measures without degrading 
the learning environment.
40
 And while these alternative measures may not 
prevent a determined, deranged individual from harming members of the 
school community, the rarity of such an event cannot justify the enormous 
amount of resources needed to protect students at all times while they are 
 
 
 37. See NATHAN JAMES & GAIL MCCALLION, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43126, SCHOOL 
RESOURCE OFFICERS: LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS IN SCHOOLS 10–11 (2013), archived at 
http://perma.cc/5BJX-M43Z; see also Kupchik et al., supra note 35 (“Of the research that exists, there 
is no clear evidence that the presence of armed guards or SROs can effectively prevent school 
violence.”). 
 38. See infra Part IV.  
 39. See infra Part III. 
 40. See infra Part V. 
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at school. Indeed, in the wake of highly-publicized acts of school violence, 
the public often forgets that schools remain among the safest places for 
children.
41
 
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Parts I through III provide the 
contextual background for the empirical analysis. Part I describes the laws, 
policies, and trends that have contributed to the creation of a pathway from 
school to prison for many students. Part II focuses specifically on the 
growing use of law enforcement to handle disciplinary problems that 
school officials traditionally handled internally in years past. It further 
describes the recent escalation of police presence in schools, despite the 
movement towards reform, in the wake of the Newtown shootings. Part III 
discusses the detrimental impact that the laws, policies, and practices 
described in Parts I and II have on students. Part IV presents an empirical 
analysis examining the relationship between a police officer’s regular 
presence at a school and the odds that school officials refer students to law 
enforcement for committing various offenses. Part V evaluates the 
concerns presented in the empirical findings and proposes alternative 
measures to address those concerns. Specifically, it urges lawmakers and 
school officials to adopt other evidence-based methods that will enhance 
school safety without degrading the learning environment. It also 
recommends that, if lawmakers and school officials do rely on police 
officers to protect students, police officers and school officials receive 
more training regarding how to appropriately discipline students and, 
additionally, enter into memoranda of understanding to avoid involving 
students with law enforcement for lower-level offenses.  
 
 
 41. See Arne Duncan, Resources for Schools to Prepare for and Recover from Crisis, 
HOMEROOM: THE OFFICIAL BLOG OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Dec. 17, 2012), http://blog.ed.gov/ 
2012/12/resources-for-schools-to-prepare-for-and-recover-from-crisis/, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
22KV-YXYQ (“Schools are among the safest places for children and adolescents in our country, and, 
in fact, crime in schools has been trending downward for more than a decade.”); see also BARBARA 
FEDDERS ET AL., LEGAL AID OF N.C., SCHOOL SAFETY IN NORTH CAROLINA: REALITIES, 
RECOMMENDATIONS & RESOURCES 4 (2013), available at http://www.issuelab.org/resource/ 
school_safety_in_north_carolina_realities_recommendations_and_resources (footnote omitted) 
(“School violence that results in death is extremely rare. Young people are much more likely to be 
harmed in the home or on the street than they are in schools.”); Randall R. Beger, The “Worst of Both 
Worlds”: School Security and the Disappearing Fourth Amendment Rights of Students, 28 CRIM. JUST. 
REV. 336, 338 (2003) (“Contrary to popular belief, schools remain among the safest places for 
children.”). 
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I. THE RISE OF THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE 
Over the last three decades, there has been a distinct shift among many 
lawmakers, school officials, and teachers regarding how to discipline 
children for violations of school rules. While at one time it was common 
for educators to send students involved in a fight to the principal’s office 
for assessment and discipline, in too many schools today it is just as 
common to refer those students to law enforcement for arrest and 
prosecution.
42
 Several scholars have referred to this shift as the 
“criminalization of school discipline.”43  
The reasons behind the criminalization of school discipline are 
complex.
44
 Several scholars have observed that the criminalization of 
school discipline has emerged parallel to and in connection with the 
criminalization of social problems generally in the United States.
45
 For 
lawmakers, declaring a “war on drugs” and “getting tough on crime” 
proved to be politically popular positions in response to the unstable 
economic and social conditions that plagued urban environments.
46
 During 
 
 
 42. See, e.g., ARRESTING DEVELOPMENT, supra note 24, at 6 (observing that in the state of 
Florida during the 2004–2005 school year, “there were 26,990 school-related referrals to the Florida 
Department of Juvenile Justice,” and 76 percent of those referrals were for misdemeanor offenses like 
disorderly conduct, trespassing, and fighting without a weapon); EDUCATION UNDER ARREST, supra 
note 28, at 15 (stating that during the 2007–08 school year in Birmingham, Alabama, 96 percent of 
students referred to juvenile court were referred for misdemeanors that included disorderly conduct 
and fighting without a weapon); FED. ADVISORY COMM. ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT 2010 
10 (2010); Kristin Henning, Criminalizing Normal Adolescent Behavior in Communities of Color: The 
Role of Prosecutors in Juvenile Justice Reform, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 383, 410 (2013) (“Whereas 
schoolteachers, principals, and school counselors once handled school-based incidents such as 
fighting, disorderly conduct, and destruction of property in school, school officials now rely on local 
police or in-house SROs to handle even the most minor of school infractions.”).  
 43. See Kathleen Nolan & Jean Anyon, Learning to Do Time: Willis’s Model of Cultural 
Reproduction in an Era of Postindustrialism, Globalization, and Mass Incarceration, in LEARNING TO 
LABOR IN NEW TIMES 133, 136 (Nadine Dolby et al. eds., 2004); Henry A. Giroux, Racial Injustice 
and Disposable Youth in the Age of Zero Tolerance, 16 QUALITATIVE STUD. IN EDUC. 553, 557 
(2003); Paul J. Hirschfield, Preparing for Prison?: The Criminalization of School Discipline in the 
USA, 12 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 79, 88 (2008); Theriot, supra note 11, at 280; Kerrin C. Wolf, 
Arrest Decision Making by School Resource Officers, 12 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 137, 138 
(2014). 
 44. See Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Limit of Zero Tolerance in Schools, 99 MINN. L. 
REV. 823, 837 (2015) (observing the complexity of the motivations and theories behind harsh 
discipline policies).  
 45. See, e.g., Donna M. Bishop & Barry C. Feld, Juvenile Justice in the Get Tough Era, in 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2766, 2770 (Gerben Bruinsma & Davis 
Weisburd eds., 2014); KATHLEEN NOLAN, POLICE IN THE HALLWAYS: DISCIPLINE IN AN URBAN HIGH 
SCHOOL 22–24 (2011); Giroux, supra note 43, at 557–58; Hirschfield, supra note 43; Nolan & Anyon, 
supra note 43. 
 46. See Hirschfield, supra note 43, at 89–90; Nolan & Anyon, supra note 43, at 138; see also 
Bishop & Feld, supra note 45, at 2770; William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 
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the last three decades, legislative bodies throughout the country passed 
harsh laws such as mandatory minimum prison sentences laws,
47
 habitual 
offender laws (“three strikes” laws),48 and truth-in-sentencing laws.49 
These policies resulted in a dramatic increase of the prison population and 
time served in prison, especially among urban minorities,
50
 while also 
providing an economic stimulus in certain communities.
51
 When violent 
crime rates for juveniles increased from the mid-1980s to 1994, 
 
 
2010 (2008) (explaining that politicians supported punitive policies governing crime because the 
opposing parties had done so and “because changing course seemed politically risky”).  
 47. See, e.g., Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 18 & 28 U.S.C.); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 220.00–.65, 221.00–.55 
(McKinney 1973) (describing the Rockefeller Drug Laws that mandated harsh minimum sentences for 
controlled substances). The Rockefeller Drug Laws spawned similar legislation in many other states. 
Nolan & Anyon, supra note 43, at 138.  
 48. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (2012). According to Joanna Shepherd, “[d]uring the 
1990s, 26 states and the federal government enacted three-strikes legislation, with similar bills 
introduced in a number of other states.” Joanna M. Shepherd, Fear of the First Strike: The Full 
Deterrent Effect of California’s Two- and Three-Strikes Legislation, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 159, 159–60 
(2002).  
 49. In the 1980s and 1990s the majority of states enacted laws that required persons convicted of 
crimes to serve not less than 85 percent of their prison sentences. See PAULA M. DITTON & DORIS 
JAMES WILSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS 3 
(1999), available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/tssp.pdf.  
 50. See NOLAN, supra note 45, at 24; Nolan & Anyon, supra note 43, at 138. The national prison 
population quadrupled from 1980 to 2000 (from 500,000 to 2 million). BRUCE WESTERN ET AL., 
JUSTICE POLICY INST., EDUCATION & INCARCERATION 4 (2003), available at http://www.justice 
policy.org/images/upload/03-08_REP_EducationIncarceration_AC-BB.pdf; see also John J. Donohue 
III & Steven D. Levitt, The Impact of Race on Policing and Arrests, 44 J.L. & ECON. 367, 367 (2001) 
(“African Americans, who comprise 12 percent of the U.S. population, account for 47 percent of 
felony convictions and 54 percent of prison admissions. Studies suggest that one-third of African-
American males aged 20–29 are under the supervision of the criminal justice system on any given 
day.”); Tracey Meares, The Legitimacy of Police Among Young African-American Men, 92 MARQ. L. 
REV. 651, 655 (2009) (“A black male high school dropout born between 1965 and 1969 had nearly a 
60% chance of going to prison by the end of the last decade.”). It is important to note, however, that 
state prison populations have fallen in recent years. See, e.g., Reid Wilson, State Prison Populations 
Down to Lowest Point in a Decade, WASH. POST (Dec. 31, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.co 
m/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/12/31/state-prison-populations-down-to-lowest-point-in-a-decade/. 
 51. For example, many white rural communities benefitted from an economic stimulus in the 
form of building prisons, hiring prison guards, and hiring additional law enforcement officers. See 
Nolan & Anyon, supra note 43, at 138; Hirschfield, supra note 43, at 89. The Violent Crime Control 
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (“Crime Control Act”) provided funding for one hundred thousand 
new police officers and $9.7 billion in funding for prisons. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: 
VIOLENT CRIME CONTROL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1994 (1994), available at https://www. 
ncjrs.gov/txtfiles/billfs.txt. The prison industry has become a significant industry in many states. The 
prison market is estimated to be worth $37.8 billion a year and employs more than 413,000 people. 
Giroux, supra note 43, at 558–59. Since the Crime Control Act was passed, many states, including 
California and New York, have spent more on prison construction than on higher education and have 
hired more prison guards than teachers. See id. at 558. Urban communities have also experienced 
economic benefits from these policies. For example, the campaign of arrest and imprisonment enabled 
urban developers to strategically redevelop downtown areas designed as “safe zones.” See Hirschfield, 
supra note 43, at 89. 
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particularly among minority youth in the inner cities, elected officials felt 
political pressure to respond in the same fashion that they responded to the 
increase in adult crime.
52
 Moreover, although juvenile crime rates have 
steadily declined since 1994,
53
 a series of high-profile school shootings 
further propelled lawmakers to respond in this manner.
54
 Consequently, 
lawmakers passed a series of harsh laws designed to deter juvenile crime 
on the streets and in schools.
55
 Indeed, focusing on ways to remove 
dangerous and disruptive students from school was a less expensive and 
more politically feasible alternative to hiring more teachers, counselors, 
and mental health professionals or implementing programs to help 
troubled students succeed in school.
56
 At the same time, many school 
officials, also facing pressure to respond to high-profile incidents of school 
 
 
 52. See BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT 
189–90 (1999) (explaining that as youth crime rates increased, especially among urban African-
Americans, public fear of social disorder also increased, leading to a denouncement of coddling youth 
criminals); Giroux, supra note 43, at 561 (observing that the zero tolerance policies in schools were 
modeled on minimum sentencing and “three strikes and you’re out” laws); Hirschfield, supra note 43, 
at 89–90. As Donna Bishop and Barry Feld describe, these violent incidents received an extraordinary 
amount of media attention, resulting in a “moral panic,” in which “the media, politicians, and the 
public reinforce each other in an escalating alarmist response that exaggerates the magnitude of the 
threat and produces urgent calls to ‘do something.’” Bishop & Feld, supra note 45, at 2768; see also 
Elizabeth S. Scott, “Children Are Different”: Constitutional Values and Justice Policy, 11 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 71, 94 (2013) (“The hostility and fear that characterized attitudes toward young offenders in 
the 1990s resulted in policies and decisions driven primarily by immediate public safety concerns and 
the goal of punishing young criminals.”). 
 53. See JEFFREY A. BUTTS, RESEARCH & EVALUATION CTR., VIOLENT YOUTH CRIME 
PLUMMETS TO A 30-YEAR LOW (2012), available at http://johnjayresearch.org/rec/files/2012/11/ 
databit201211.pdf; JACOB KANG-BROWN ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUST., A GENERATION LATER: WHAT 
WE’VE LEARNED ABOUT ZERO TOLERANCE IN SCHOOLS 2 (2013), available at http://www.vera.org/ 
sites/default/files/resources/downloads/zero-tolerance-in-schools-policy-brief.pdf.  
 54. See Torin Monahan & Rodolfo D. Torres, Introduction, in SCHOOLS UNDER SURVEILLANCE: 
CULTURES OF CONTROL IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 2–3 (Torin Monahan & Rodolfo D. Torres eds., 2009) 
[hereinafter SCHOOLS UNDER SURVEILLANCE] (“[T]he threat of ‘another Columbine’ (or Virginia 
Tech, and so on) haunts the social imaginary, leading parents, policy makers, and others to the sober 
conclusion that any security measure is worth whatever trade-offs are involved in order to ensure 
safety.”); Elizabeth S. Scott, Miller v. Alabama and the (Past and) Future of Juvenile Crime 
Regulation, 31 LAW & INEQ. 535, 541 (2013) (observing that although serious acts of school violence 
are rare events, after the Columbine shootings “legislatures across the country rushed to pass strict 
zero tolerance laws, making it a crime to threaten violence in school”).  
 55. See infra Parts I–II; see also PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE 
RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME xi (1996) (documenting states’ legislative and 
executive action that shifted towards the goal of punishing criminal behavior rather than rehabilitating 
the offenders in response to increases in juvenile crime). For example, several states passed laws that 
facilitated transferring more juvenile defendants to criminal courts to be tried as adults. Bishop & Feld, 
supra note 45, at 2768. For an analysis of the evolution of these laws, see generally Barry C. Feld & 
Donna M. Bishop, Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE 
CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 801, 801–42 (Barry C. Feld & Donna M. Bishop eds., 2012), and Scott, 
supra note 52, at 92–94. 
 56. See Hirschfield, supra note 43, at 90.  
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violence, adopted a similar punitive mindset, embracing strict, heavy-
handed disciplinary methods to maintain order and control in their 
buildings.
57
 The end result is a series of laws, policies, and practices that 
have pushed more students out of school and into the justice system.  
This Part will discuss the laws, policies, practices, and trends that have 
converged over approximately the last three decades, resulting in the 
creation of a pathway from school to prison for too many students. Some 
of these laws, policies, practices, and trends stem directly from the “tough 
on crime,” punitive mindset described above. Others are less related to that 
mindset, but still contribute to the Pipeline in other ways.  
A. Zero Tolerance Laws and Policies 
Perhaps no other “tough on crime” law or policy affecting students has 
received more attention than zero tolerance laws and policies.
58
 As a 
condition for receiving federal funds, the Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994 
requires states to pass laws that compel schools to expel students for at 
least one year for bringing a firearm on school grounds.
59
 The Gun-Free 
Schools Act signaled a validation by the federal government of the 
 
 
 57. See Kevin P. Brady et al., School-Police Partnership Effectiveness in Urban Schools: An 
Analysis of New York City’s Impact Schools Initiative, 39 EDUC. & URB. SOC’Y 455, 456 (2007) (“An 
increasing fear of school violence coupled with the public’s misperceptions of the actual degree of 
violence in our nation’s schools has caused school officials, especially those located in urban areas, to 
implement more punitive-based school discipline policies and practices for responding to and 
preventing student crime and violence.”); Hirschfield, supra note 43, at 91; see also ATLANTA PUB. 
SCHS., 2014-15 STUDENT HANDBOOK 18–20 (2014), available at http://www.atlantapublicschools. 
us/cms/lib/GA01000924/Centricity/Domain/94/2014-15%20APS%20Student%20Handbook__web.pdf 
(citing offenses that require suspension or expulsion); HOUS. INDEP. SCH. DIST., 2013-2014 CODE OF 
STUDENT CONDUCT 14 (2013), available at http://www.houstonisd.org/cms/lib2/TX01 
001591/Centricity/Domain/30485/2013-2014_Code_of_Student_Conduct.pdf; MIAMI-DADE CNTY. 
PUB. SCHS., CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT—SECONDARY 57–73 (2014), available at 
http://ehandbooks.dadeschools.net/policies/90/CSC_sec_14-15.pdf. Of course, the reasons why 
numerous school officials have embraced strict disciplinary methods extend well beyond responding to 
high-profile incidents of school violence or enhancing their credibility among parents and the general 
public. These reasons are discussed in more detail in Part I.E. 
 58. See, e.g., ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, TEST, PUNISH, AND PUSH OUT: HOW “ZERO 
TOLERANCE” AND HIGH-STAKES TESTING FUNNEL YOUTH INTO THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE 
(2010), available at http://b.3cdn.net/advancement/d05cb2181a4545db07_r2im6caqe.pdf [hereinafter 
TEST, PUNISH, AND PUSH OUT]; Am. Psychological Ass’n Zero Tolerance Task Force, Are Zero 
Tolerance Policies Effective in the Schools? An Evidentiary Review and Recommendations, 63 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 852 (2008) [hereinafter Are Zero Tolerance Policies Effective in the Schools?]; KANG-
BROWN ET AL., supra note 53; Black, supra note 44.  
 59. See 20 U.S.C. § 7151(b)(1) (2014). This law is softened somewhat by permitting 
superintendents to modify the expulsion requirement on a case-by-case basis. See id.; see also Federal 
Law on Guns in Schools, LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, http://smartgunlaws.org/federal-law-
on-guns-in-schools/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2016). 
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concept of “zero tolerance” in school disciplinary practices.60 Borrowed 
from an approach to drug enforcement,
61
 zero tolerance “mandates the 
application of predetermined consequences, most often severe and 
punitive in nature, that are intended to be applied regardless of the gravity 
of behavior, mitigating circumstances, or situational context.”62  
Many states and schools have adopted laws and policies modeled after 
the Gun-Free Schools Act by creating strict rules that impose 
predetermined consequences for certain acts, such as suspension or 
expulsion, irrespective of the surrounding circumstances.
63
 These laws and 
policies have extended well beyond bringing a firearm to school.
64
 States 
and localities have applied zero tolerance to a multitude of offenses, 
including possession of drugs, alcohol, or tobacco; fighting; dress-code 
violations; truancy; and tardiness.
65
 Scholars and youth advocacy groups 
have strongly criticized zero tolerance policies, arguing that they are both 
 
 
 60. See Udi Ofer, Criminalizing the Classroom: The Rise of Aggressive Policing and Zero 
Tolerance Discipline in New York City Public Schools, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1373, 1376 (2011/12).  
 61. See Russell J. Skiba & M. Karega Rausch, Zero Tolerance, Suspension, and Expulsion: 
Questions of Equity and Effectiveness, in HANDBOOK OF CLASSROOM MANAGEMENT: RESEARCH, 
PRACTICE, AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 1063, 1063 (Carolyn M. Evertson & Carol S. Weinstein eds., 
2006) (citation omitted) (“Zero tolerance emerged from national drug policy of the 1990s and 
mandates severe punishments, typically out-of-school suspension and expulsion, for both serious and 
relatively minor infractions.”).  
 62. Are Zero Tolerance Policies Effective in the Schools?, supra note 58, at 852; see also KIM ET 
AL., supra note 16, at 80.  
 63. See Deborah Gordon Klehr, Addressing the Unintended Consequences of No Child Left 
Behind and Zero Tolerance: Better Strategies for Safe Schools and Successful Students, 16 GEO. J. ON 
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 585, 589 (2009).  
 64. See Michael P. Krezmien et al., Juvenile Court Referrals and the Public Schools: Nature and 
Extent of the Practice in Five States, 26 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 273, 274 (2010) (explaining that 
zero tolerance policies have extended to minor disciplinary infractions). This has happened despite the 
fact that the Gun-Free Schools Act “does not require that states or schools implement wide-ranging 
zero-tolerance policies or rely on exclusionary discipline for any other types of student misconduct 
[outside of bringing a firearm to school].” U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., GUIDING PRINCIPLES: A RESOURCE 
GUIDE FOR IMPROVING SCHOOL CLIMATE AND DISCIPLINE 15 (2014), available at http://www2. 
ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/school-discipline/guiding-principles.pdf [hereinafter GUIDING PRINCIPLES]. 
 65. See KIM ET AL., supra note 16, at 80. Professor Barry Feld explains that zero tolerance 
policies are similar in nature to “broken windows” theories, which hypothesize that failure to respond 
to minor infractions will lead to more serious infractions. Barry C. Feld, T.L.O. and Redding’s 
Unanswered (Misanswered) Fourth Amendment Questions: Few Rights and Fewer Remedies, 80 
MISS. L.J. 847, 886–87 (2011); Tom R. Tyler et al., The Consequences of Being an Object of 
Suspicion: Potential Pitfalls of Proactive Police Contact, 12 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 602, 607–08 
(2015) (arguing that zero tolerance policies are based on the premises of the “broken windows” theory, 
but also are more expansive because they draw more individuals into the criminal justice system by 
prosecuting them for minor lifestyle crimes, not just for behaviors that are commonly viewed as 
socially unacceptable); see also Ofer, supra note 60, at 1378.  
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ineffective and counterproductive.
66
 Not only is there no evidence that 
zero tolerance policies have made schools safer,
67
 these policies have also 
pushed more students out of schools and into the juvenile justice system.
68
  
B. Federal and State Statutory Reporting Requirements  
Other “tough on crime” laws that have contributed to putting more 
students on a pathway to prison include federal and state statutes that 
mandate reporting certain school misconduct to law enforcement.
69
 
Pursuant to the Gun-Free Schools Act, the federal government obligates 
all local education agencies (i.e., school districts) that receive federal 
funds under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act to have “a 
policy requiring referral to the criminal justice or juvenile delinquency 
system of any student who brings a firearm or weapon to a school.”70 
Thus, as virtually every public school district receives federal funds under 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, virtually every school 
district is required to have a policy in place that compels school officials to 
refer students who bring weapons to school to law enforcement.
71
  
Furthermore, many state legislatures have enacted statutes mandating 
that school officials refer students to law enforcement for various offenses 
that occur at school that do not involve a weapon. For example, an original 
 
 
 66. See, e.g., Are Zero Tolerance Policies Effective in the Schools?, supra note 58, at 857 
(finding that the overwhelming research available on zero tolerance contradicts the assumptions on 
which those policies are based); Black, supra note 44, at 837–41 (arguing that zero tolerance policies 
have not achieved their intended purpose). In January 2014, the US Department of Education’s Office 
of Civil Rights issued a resource guide for improving school climate and discipline, suggesting that 
schools employ a tiered approach to discipline and reminding schools that the federal Gun-Free 
Schools Act does not require schools to rely on zero tolerance policies for offenses except those 
involving firearms. GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 64, at 15. 
 67. See ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV., OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED: THE 
DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES OF ZERO TOLERANCE AND SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 17 (2000), available at 
http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/school-discipline/opportunities-suspended-th 
e-devastating-consequences-of-zero-tolerance-and-school-discipline-policies/crp-opportunities-suspen 
ded-zero-tolerance-2000.pdf [hereinafter OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED] (stating that after four years of 
implementation, schools that used zero tolerance policies were less safe than those that did not use 
them); ARRESTING DEVELOPMENT, supra note 24, at 10; Are Zero Tolerance Policies Effective in the 
Schools?, supra note 58, at 857 (finding that “zero tolerance policies have not provided evidence that 
such approaches can guarantee safe and productive school climates”); Krezmien et al., supra note 64, 
at 274.  
 68. See KIM ET AL., supra note 16, at 78.  
 69. One might classify these mandatory reporting laws also as “zero tolerance” policies because 
they require school officials to report certain activities that occur on school property to law 
enforcement authorities regardless of the surrounding circumstances. 
 70. 20 U.S.C. § 7151(h)(1) (2014). 
 71. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 1006.07(g) (2014) (mandating that any student who brings a firearm 
or weapon to any school function will be referred to the juvenile justice system).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss4/6
  
 
 
 
 
2016] STUDENTS, POLICE, AND THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE 935 
 
 
 
 
search of all fifty states’ statutes reveals that twenty-six states require 
school officials to refer students to law enforcement for incidents relating 
to controlled substances,
72
 fifteen states require referral for offenses 
involving alcohol,
73
 eight states mandate referral for theft,
74
 nine states for 
vandalism of school property,
75
 and eleven states for robbery without 
using a weapon.
76
 Some states have statutes that provide a specific list of 
offenses that school officials must report to law enforcement.
77
 Other 
states have generalized reporting statutes. For example, Alabama requires 
school officials to report any “violent disruptive incidents occurring on 
school property during school hours or during school activities conducted 
on or off school property after school hours.”78 Illinois requires school 
officials to report “each alleged incident of intimidation” of which “he or 
 
 
 72. See ALA. CODE § 16-1-24.1 (2014); ALASKA STAT. § 14.33.130(b)(2) (2014); CAL. EDUC. 
CODE § 48902(b) (2014); CONN GEN. STAT. § 10-221 (2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4112(c) 
(2015); FLA. STAT. § 1006.09 (2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-1184 (2015); HAW. REV. STAT. § 302A-
1002(1) (2015); IDAHO CODE § 33-210(1) (2015); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 127/2-2 (2015); IND. CODE 
§ 20-33-9-6 (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-89b03(b) (2014); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.154 (2015); 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:416.3 (2014); MD. CODE REGS. 13A.08.01.08 (2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 380.1308 (2015); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-11-29(1), (6) (2015); MO. REV. STAT. § 160.261.2(10) 
(2015); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 79-267(6), 79-293 (2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-288 (2014); N.J. 
ADMIN. CODE § 6A:16-6.3(a) (2015); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2801 (McKinney 2012); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, 
§ 24-132 (2015); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 13-1303-A (2011); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.015(a) (West 
2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-279.3:1 (2015); MICH. DEP’T OF EDUC., SCHOOL SAFETY RESPONSE 
GUIDE 21 (1999), available at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/schsfty_ 8356_7.pdf. 
 73. See ALA. CODE § 16-1-24.1; ALASKA STAT. § 14.33.130(b)(2); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48902(b); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-221; FLA. STAT. § 1006.09; HAW. REV. STAT. § 302A-1002(1); IDAHO CODE 
§ 33-210(1); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-89b03(b); MD. CODE REGS. 13A.08.01.08; MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 380.1308; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 79-267(6), 79-293; N.J. ADMIN CODE § 6A:16-6.4 (2015); N.Y. EDUC. 
LAW § 2801; 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13-1303-A; VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-279.3:1; MICH. DEP’T OF 
EDUC., supra note 72, at 24. 
 74. See ALASKA STAT. § 14.33.130(b)(2); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-1184; HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 302A-1002(1)(B); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-89b03(b); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.1308; NEB. REV. 
STAT. §§ 79-267(2), 79-293; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-D:4-I(a) (2015); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2801; 
MICH. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 72, at 18. I define theft as the unlawful taking of personal property 
without using force, such as violence or the threat of violence.  
 75. See ALASKA STAT. § 14.33.130(b)(2); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-1184; HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 302A-1002(1)(B); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-89b03(b); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.154; MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 380.1308; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 79-267(2), 79-293; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-D:4-I(a); N.Y. 
EDUC. LAW § 2801; MICH. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 72, at 23.  
 76. See ALASKA STAT. § 14.33.130(b)(2); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4112(a)–(b); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 20-2-1184; HAW. REV. STAT. § 302A-1002(1)(B); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/34-84a.1 (2015); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-89b03(b); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.1308; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 79-267, 79-293; 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-D:4; N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2801; S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-24-60 (2014); MICH. 
DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 72, at 14. I define robbery without a weapon as taking property by force or 
threat of force.  
 77. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-1184; HAW. REV. STAT. § 302A-1002; MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 37-11-29; MO. REV. STAT. § 160.261; NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-267; TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.015; 
VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-279.3:1.  
 78. ALA. CODE § 16-1-24(b) (2014). 
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she has knowledge.”79 To induce compliance, several states impose 
criminal liability or other punitive actions on school officials who fail to 
report certain offenses to law enforcement.
80
 Several states also grant 
school officials or other school employees immunity from lawsuits when 
reporting offenses to law enforcement in good faith.
81
 It is important to 
note that many local school districts have their own reporting policies, 
even though there may be no statutory obligation to report certain offenses 
to law enforcement.
82
  
C. Students’ Limited Constitutional Protections at School 
Despite the Supreme Court’s pronouncement that students do not “shed 
their constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate,”83 students’ 
constitutional protections with respect to investigation, detainment, 
interrogation, and punishment at school are quite limited.
84
 For example, 
 
 
 79. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/34-84a.1. Acts of intimidation include inflicting harm on another 
person; threatening another person; physically restraining a person; and exposing another person to 
hatred, contempt, or ridicule. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-6 (2015).  
 80. See ALA. CODE § 16-1-24(e) (2014) (stating that school officials will be guilty of a Class C 
misdemeanor); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-17-113(d) (2015) (stating that school officials will be guilty of a 
Class C misdemeanor); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4112(e) (levying fines on school employees for 
failing to report); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-1184(d) (stating that school officials will be guilty of a 
misdemeanor for failing to report); HAW. REV. STAT. § 302A-1002(3) (failing to report may result in 
probation, suspension, demotion, or termination of school officials); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-
27.1A(b) (2015) (stating that knowingly failing to report the first time is a petty offense, and a 
subsequent offense is a Class C misdemeanor); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-89b04 (2014) (stating that 
failing to report is a class B misdemeanor); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-11-29(3) (stating that failing to 
report results in a misdemeanor); MO. REV. STAT. § 167.117(5) (2015); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-
D:6 (2015) (stating that any person failing to report “shall be guilty of a violation”); S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 59-63-335 (2014) (failing to report results in liability of attorney’s fees and costs for an action to 
compel the school official to report); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.171 (West 2015) (stating that 
failing to report results in a Class A misdemeanor).  
 81. See ALASKA STAT. § 14.33.140 (2014); CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 48902(d), 49334 (West 2014); 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4112(f); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-1184(c); HAW. REV. STAT. § 302A-1003 
(2015); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-27.1A(b); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-89b03(h); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 380.1313(2) (2015); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-11-29(5); MO. REV. STAT. § 167.117(4); NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 79-293(2); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 24-132.A (2015); OR. REV. STAT. § 339.315(b) (2015); TEX. 
EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.015(f); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-1101(2) (West 2015).  
 82. See, e.g., HOUS. INDEP. SCH. DIST., supra note 57, at 14 (maintaining that the principal must 
notify the police when she has reasonable grounds to believe that a student has committed a criminal 
offense at school); MIAMI-DADE CNTY. PUB. SCHS., supra note 57, at 57 (stating that certain behavior, 
“must, by Board Rule, be reported to appropriate police authorities and to the Miami-Dade Schools 
Police”).  
 83. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).  
 84. See Catherine Y. Kim, Policing School Discipline, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 861, 861 (2012) 
(observing that “courts routinely defer to school officials in cases involving the investigation and 
punishment of youth”); see also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Constitutionalization of Children’s 
Rights: Incorporating Emerging Human Rights into Constitutional Doctrine, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 
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over the last few decades, courts have weakened students’ Fourth 
Amendment rights in schools in order to support school officials’ efforts to 
promote safety and discipline within schools.
85
 Before conducting a 
search, school officials do not need to obtain a warrant or show probable 
cause.
86
 In addition, school officials need not have an individualized 
suspicion that a student violated a school rule before conducting a 
search.
87
 This movement in the law has emboldened school officials to 
rely on intense surveillance methods to maintain order and control. Courts 
permit school officials to use metal detectors,
88
 search through students’ 
lockers,
89
 monitor students with surveillance cameras,
90
 and conduct 
 
 
(1999) (discussing generally the lack of constitutional protections for children in comparison to other 
countries).  
 85. See Jason P. Nance, Random, Suspicionless Searches of Students’ Belongings: A Legal, 
Empirical, and Normative Analysis, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 367 (2013) [hereinafter Nance, Random, 
Suspicionless Searches]; Jason P. Nance, Students, Security, and Race, 63 EMORY L.J. 1, 7–13 (2013) 
[hereinafter Nance, Students, Security, and Race]; James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Public 
Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1415 (2000) (stating that “the Court’s decisions regarding student 
searches rest on the value-laden view that maintaining discipline is necessary to preserve the 
educational process of schools”). Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that while the Court has 
been criticized for attenuating students’ Fourth Amendment rights in schools, it squarely held in New 
Jersey v. T.L.O. that students do indeed have those rights. 469 U.S. 325, 332–33 (1985). Prior to 
T.L.O., several lower courts had recognized the in loco parentis doctrine, holding that the Fourth 
Amendment did not apply to school searches because school administrators acted in the place of 
parents during school hours. See Nance, Random, Suspicionless Searches, supra, at 377 n.38.  
 86. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340–42 (holding that school officials do not need to obtain a warrant, 
and their level of suspicion does not need to meet the probable cause standard before searching a 
student); see also Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and the Fourth 
Amendment, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 834 (2011) (describing generally the Court’s shift toward the 
acceptance of suspicionless search programs in schools and other contexts); Christopher Slobogin, The 
World Without A Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 25 (1991) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (describing T.L.O.’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, which states that searches in the 
school context are “special needs” situations that “make the warrant and probable-cause requirement 
impracticable”). Interestingly, there is a recent line of cases where courts have not justified school 
officials’ searches of information stored on students’ cell phones. See, e.g., G.C. v. Owensboro Pub. 
Schs., 711 F.3d 623 (6th Cir. 2013); Gallimore v. Henrico Cnty. Sch. Bd., 38 F. Supp. 3d 721 (E.D. 
Va. 2014); cf. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (holding that the police must obtain a search 
warrant before searching through digital information stored on a cell phone of someone who has been 
arrested).  
 87. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 838 
(2002) (holding that individualized suspicion was not required to perform random drug tests on 
students participating in extracurricular activities); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 
665–66 (1995) (holding that individualized suspicion was not required to perform random drug tests 
on student athletes). 
 88. See, e.g., Hough v. Shakopee Pub. Schs., 608 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1106 (D. Minn. 2009); In re 
Latasha W., 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 886, 886–87 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. J.A., 679 So. 2d 316, 319–20 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1996); In re F.B., 726 A.2d 361, 366 (Pa. 1999). 
 89. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 666 N.W.2d 142, 150 (Iowa 2003); In re Patrick Y., 746 A.2d 405, 
414–15 (Md. 2000); In re Isiah B., 500 N.W.2d 637, 641 (Wis. 1993). However, there is a substantial 
disagreement among courts regarding whether students possess an expectation of privacy in their 
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random drug testing on students.
91
 In fact, many schools throughout the 
country routinely rely on these strict measures to monitor students.
92
 
Furthermore, many courts have denied such criminal procedural 
protections to a student even when a law enforcement officer participates 
in a search at school.
93
 Likewise, courts consistently hold that a school 
official may question a student without providing Miranda warnings, 
regardless of the possibility that the school official might later refer that 
student to law enforcement for wrongdoing.
94
 Some courts have even held 
that it is unnecessary to provide Miranda warnings when a police officer is 
 
 
lockers. See KIM ET AL., supra note 16, at 116; Feld, supra note 65, at 933–37; Nance, Random, 
Suspicionless Searches, supra note 85, at 411–12. In addition, there is no compelling basis to conclude 
that students should lose their expectation of privacy in their personal belongings simply because 
students place them in their lockers. See Nance, Random, Suspicionless Searches, supra note 85, at 
411–12. 
 90. See, e.g., United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 677 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Videotaping of 
suspects in public places, such as banks, does not violate the [F]ourth [A]mendment . . . .”). However, 
courts do not permit surreptitious video surveillance in certain locations, such as student lockers rooms 
or bathrooms. See Brannum v. Overton Cnty. Sch. Bd., 516 F.3d 489, 499–500 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that surreptitious video surveillance of a student locker room violates the Fourth 
Amendment).  
 91. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 838 (upholding a school district’s random drug testing program on 
students participating in extracurricular activities); Acton, 515 U.S. at 665–66 (upholding a school 
district’s random drug testing program on student athletes). See Nance, Random, Suspicionless 
Searches, supra note 85, at 380–87, 391–94, for an extended analysis of these cases.  
 92. JAMES & MCCALLION, supra note 37, at 23; Nance, Random, Suspicionless Searches, supra 
note 85, at 409–10; Nance, Students, Security, and Race, supra note 85, at 12–13. 
 93. In New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 n.7 (1985), the US Supreme Court stated that it 
was not deciding “the question of the appropriate standard for assessing the legality of searches 
conducted by school officials in conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement agencies.” As a 
result, lower courts have reached divergent conclusions on this complex issue. See KIM ET AL., supra 
note 16, at 120–22 (discussing cases); Josh Kagan, Reappraising T.L.O.’s “Special Needs” Doctrine 
in an Era of School-Law Enforcement Entanglement, 33 J.L. & EDUC. 291, 316–20 (2004) (discussing 
cases); Michael Pinard, From the Classroom to the Courtroom: Reassessing Fourth Amendment 
Standards in Public School Searches Involving Law Enforcement Authorities, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 1067, 
1080–90 (2003) (discussing cases and concluding that “courts only require the more stringent probable 
cause standard in fairly narrow circumstances”); Lisa H. Thurau & Johanna Wald, Controlling 
Partners: When Law Enforcement Meets Discipline in Public Schools, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 977, 
982–86 (2009/10) (discussing the disparate court holdings when analyzing student searches involving 
law enforcement officers); Kim, supra note 84, at 866 n.20 (discussing cases).  
 94. See, e.g., S.E. v. Grant Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 544 F.3d 633, 640–41 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding 
that the school official was not required to provide Miranda warnings during his investigation); K.A. 
v. Abington Heights Sch. Dist., 28 F. Supp. 3d 356, 366 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (dismissing the student’s 
Fifth Amendment claim because only school officials were present during the investigation); C.S. v. 
Couch, 843 F. Supp. 2d 894, 917–20 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (holding that the school officials were not 
required to provide Miranda warnings); Boynton v. Casey, 543 F. Supp. 995, 997 (D. Me. 1982) 
(holding that a school official was not required to provide Miranda warnings during an interrogation); 
see also BARRY C. FELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON JUVENILE JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION 336–38 
(4th ed. 2013); KIM ET AL., supra note 16, at 118; Paul Holland, Schooling Miranda: Policing 
Interrogation in the Twenty-First Century Schoolhouse, 52 LOY. L. REV. 39, 59 n.90 (2006); Kim, 
supra note 84, at 861.  
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with the school official during that interview.
95
 Thus, school officials and, 
in many instances, police officers stationed in schools working with school 
officials, can provide evidence to prosecutors that they obtained under 
circumstances that would render such evidence inadmissible if seized from 
an adult or from a juvenile outside of the school context.
96
 These methods, 
especially when coupled with the zero tolerance policies, end up pushing 
more students out of school or directly into the juvenile justice system.
97
 
Moreover, courts have not provided students with strong procedural 
protections under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
for disciplinary matters. While the Supreme Court held in Goss v. Lopez 
that students do have a legitimate property interest to a public education 
provided under a state constitution, the Court also concluded that students 
were entitled only to minimal protections for short-term suspensions of ten 
days or less.
98
 But perhaps more significantly, although students 
theoretically are entitled to more robust procedural protections before 
receiving long-term suspensions or expulsions,
99
 scholars agree and school 
officials admit that these disciplinary proceedings typically are not 
 
 
 95. See, e.g., State v. J.T.D., 851 So.2d 793, 797 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that Miranda 
warnings were not required during questioning by a school official in the presence of a law 
enforcement officer); People v. Pankhurst, 848 N.E.2d 628, 633–34 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (holding that 
the student was not entitled to Miranda warnings because, even though an officer was present, the 
school official did not receive any advice from the officer regarding how to conduct the investigation); 
In re Tateana R., 883 N.Y.S.2d 476, 477–78 (App. Div. 2009) (holding that the mere presence of a 
school resource officer during the investigation of a student did not entitle a student to Miranda 
warnings); J.D. v. Commonwealth, 591 S.E.2d 721, 724–26 (Va. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the 
student was not entitled to Miranda warnings in the presence of a law enforcement officer because the 
school official did not receive any advice from the officer regarding how to conduct the investigation); 
State v. Schloegel, 769 N.W.2d 130, 133–34 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that Miranda warnings 
were not required during questioning by a school official in the presence of a law enforcement officer). 
Nevertheless, if a police officer stationed at the school (or police officer not stationed at the school) 
interrogates the student, Miranda warnings may be required. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 
2394 (2011) (holding that the court must take into consideration the student’s age when determining 
whether a student was in custody for Miranda purposes when being questioned by a police officer at 
school); see also FELD, supra note 94, at 336–37 (discussing cases); KIM ET AL., supra note 16, at 120 
(discussing cases). 
 96. See Kim, supra note 84, at 865–66; KIM ET AL., supra note 16, at 118–20.  
 97. See Feld, supra note 65, at 884–95 (arguing that the combination of SROs, students’ 
diminished constitutional rights, school accountability laws, and zero tolerance policies puts more 
students on a path from school to prison).  
 98. 419 U.S. 565, 574–75 (1975). With respect to short suspensions of ten days or less, the Court 
held that students are not entitled to secure counsel, cross examine witnesses, or call their own 
witnesses. Rather, they are entitled only to “some kind of notice” and “some kind of hearing,” which 
could consist of an “informal give-and-take” consisting of simply informing the student of the 
misconduct and providing the student with an opportunity to explain what happened. Id. at 579, 582, 
584.  
 99. See id. at 584 (“Longer suspensions or expulsions for the remainder of the school term, or 
permanently, may require more formal procedures.”).  
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deliberative, collaborative, or aimed at accuracy, justice, or helping the 
student.
100
 Rather, due process too often is only a routine hoop through 
which a school must jump to produce a favored result.
101
 Thus, as long as 
school officials follow the prescribed routine, schools’ disciplinary 
decisions are presumed valid and courts will uphold them.
102
 
D. High-Stakes Testing Laws 
Federal and state accountability laws also have had the unintended 
consequence of contributing to the Pipeline by creating a perverse 
incentive to push more students out of school. Federal and state 
accountability laws obligate schools to regularly test students and may 
inflict consequences on schools that do not meet certain standards.
103
 To 
avoid various sanctions, many scholars worry that school officials may 
sometimes push low-performing students out of their schools by 
suspending them, expelling them, or referring them to the juvenile justice 
system to avoid having their low scores count against them.
104
  
 
 
 100. See Black, supra note 44, at 846. 
 101. See id.; see also RICHARD ARUM, JUDGING SCHOOL DISCIPLINE: THE CRISIS OF MORAL 
AUTHORITY 5–6 (2005); JUDITH KAFKA, THE HISTORY OF “ZERO TOLERANCE” IN AMERICAN PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS 6 (2011). Scholars have posited reasons for why the routine process very often only results 
in a sham. For example, the Court did not articulate what these more robust procedural protections 
might be or a standard to measure their adequacy. See generally Black, supra note 44, at 844–55 
(describing the shortcomings of Goss v. Lopez). Other scholars maintain that the absence of guidance 
from the Court provides a fruitful area for lawyers to expand the procedural protections to which 
students should be entitled. See KIM ET AL., supra note 16, at 82–84 (providing guidance to advocates 
to expand protections to students subject to long-term suspensions and expulsions). 
 102. Black, supra note 44, at 859.  
 103. For instance, the now-defunct No Child Left Behind Act required schools receiving federal 
funds to administer various academic assessments to students at different stages during grades three 
through twelve, see Testing: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/ 
nclb/ accountability/ayp/testing-faq.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2016), and imposed sanctions on schools 
whose students failed to meet certain standards. See Monahan & Torres, supra note 54, at 5. The 
newly-enacted Every Student Succeeds Act, Pub. L. 114-95 (2015), which replaced the No Child Left 
Behind Act, also requires states receiving federal funds to implement student academic assessments in 
their public schools, see id. § 1111(b)(2). However, one of the hallmarks of the Every Student 
Succeeds Act is that it prohibits the federal government from determining the weight of those 
assessments for accountability purposes. See id. § 1111(e)(1)(B)(iii); SENATE COMM. ON HEALTH, 
EDUC., LABOR, AND PENSIONS, THE EVERY CHILD ACHIEVES ACT OF 2015 1, available at 
http://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/The_Every_Child_Achieves_Act_of_2015--summary.pdf.  
 104. See, e.g., FED. ADVISORY COMM. ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 42, at 10; NAACP 
LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, DISMANTLING THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE 5 (2005); TEST, PUNISH, 
AND PUSH OUT, supra note 58, at 28–33 (discussing that NCLB puts pressure on schools to push out 
low-performing students); Linda Darling-Hammond, Race, Inequality and Educational Accountability: 
The Irony of ‘No Child Left Behind,’ 10 RACE, ETHNICITY & EDUC. 245, 252–55 (2007); James E. 
Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 969–70 
(2004); Kupchik et al., supra note 35; Klehr, supra note 63, at 602–03; Krezmien et al., supra note 64, 
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E. Academic Underachievement and the Mindset of Educators 
Two more intricately related factors that contribute to the Pipeline 
include student academic underachievement and how educators choose to 
handle disciplinary issues. While the connection between 
underachievement and student involvement in the justice system will not 
be fully explored in this Article, when students do not graduate from high 
school and obtain the skills to procure adequate employment, they are 
more likely to become involved in the justice system at some point in their 
lives.
105
  
In addition, and more relevant to the disciplinary focus of this Article, 
student underachievement often leads to student misbehavior in the 
classroom. Empirical studies show that it is common for low-performing 
students to misbehave out of frustration or embarrassment when they are 
unable to learn the academic material and meet grade-level 
expectations.
106
 As many educators well understand, when students begin 
to comprehend that the educational process is not working for them—that 
they will not be admitted to college, have access to a well-paying job, or 
enjoy a promising career—they have fewer incentives to obey school rules 
 
 
at 274 (“The high-stakes assessments associated with the No Child Left Behind Act left little room in 
schools for student misbehavior.”); cf. Rachel F. Moran, Sorting and Reforming: High-Stakes Testing 
in the Public Schools, 34 AKRON L. REV. 107, 115 (2000) (arguing that in a high-stakes testing 
context, low-performing students are in danger of being pushed out of schools).  
 105. See CLIVE R. BELFIELD ET AL., THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF OPPORTUNITY YOUTH 20 (2012); 
MELISSA SICKMUND & CHARLES PUZZANCHERA, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVENILE 
OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2014 NATIONAL REPORT 14–15 (2014) (noting that in 2009, 40 percent of 
institutionalized persons had dropped out of high school, whereas only 8 percent of 
noninstitutionalized persons had dropped out of high school, and explaining that in 2006, almost one in 
ten male high school dropouts was institutionalized compared to less than one in thirty-three male high 
school graduates); ANDREW SUM ET AL., CTR. FOR LABOR MKT. STUD., THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
DROPPING OUT OF HIGH SCHOOL: JOBLESSNESS AND JAILING FOR HIGH SCHOOL DROPOUTS AND THE 
HIGH COST FOR TAXPAYERS 7–11 (2009). It is important to emphasize that these studies show a strong 
association between dropping out of school and becoming incarcerated, but they do not demonstrate a 
causal relationship.  
 106. See MATTHEW P. STEINBERG ET AL., CONSORTIUM ON CHI. SCH. RESEARCH, UNIV. OF CHI. 
URBAN EDUC. INST., STUDENT AND TEACHER SAFETY IN CHICAGO PUBLIC SCHOOLS: THE ROLES OF 
COMMUNITY CONTEXT AND SCHOOL SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 46 (2011), available at 
http://ccsr.uchicago.edu/downloads/8499safety_in_cps.pdf (observing that low-performing students 
are less likely to be engaged in school and more likely to be frustrated and misbehave); Matthew P. 
Steinberg et al., What Conditions Support Safety in Urban Schools?: The Influence of School 
Organizational Practices on Student and Teacher Reports of Safety in Chicago, in CLOSING THE 
SCHOOL DISCIPLINE GAP: EQUITABLE REMEDIES FOR EXCESSIVE EXCLUSION 118, 125 (Daniel J. 
Losen ed., 2015) [hereinafter CLOSING THE SCHOOL DISCIPLINE GAP] (maintaining that low-
performing students are less likely to be engaged and more likely to act out). 
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and take school seriously.
107
 And although federal and state laws require 
educators to suspend, expel, or refer a student to law enforcement for 
certain offenses, many educators choose to employ such harsh measures 
for more trivial matters, such as minor disturbances in the classroom.
108
  
Of particular concern is that many school officials and teachers who 
work with minority students living in poor neighborhoods have a stronger 
tendency to adopt this harsh, punitive mindset when disciplining 
students.
109
 The reasons for these attitudes are multi-layered and complex. 
There is troubling empirical evidence suggesting that some teachers and 
school officials believe that some students, particularly African-American 
males, are “bound for jail” and “unsalvageable.”110 Teachers and school 
 
 
 107. PAUL WILLIS, LEARNING TO LABOR: HOW WORKING CLASS KIDS GET WORKING CLASS 
JOBS 72 (1977) (explaining that “teacher[s’] authority becomes increasingly the random one of the 
prison guard, not the necessary one of the pedagogue,” when students think that the knowledge, skills, 
and credentials acquired in school are irrelevant); STEINBERG ET AL., supra note 106, at 27–31, 46 
(finding that students’ academic skills are highly correlated with overall safety at a school); Pedro A. 
Noguera, Schools, Prisons, and Social Implications of Punishment: Rethinking Disciplinary Practices, 
42 THEORY INTO PRAC. 341, 343 (2003); see also Nance, School Surveillance and the Fourth 
Amendment, supra note 16, at 100.  
 108. See ACTION FOR CHILDREN, FROM PUSH OUT TO LOCK UP: NORTH CAROLINA’S 
ACCELERATED SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE 9 (2013), available at http://www.ncchild.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/05/2013_STPP-FINAL.pdf [hereinafter FROM PUSH OUT TO LOCK UP] 
(“Students were most commonly referred to the juvenile justice system for low-level offenses . . . .”); 
AM. BAR ASS’N, JUVENILE JUSTICE COMM’N, ZERO TOLERANCE POLICIES: A REPORT 2 (2001), 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/2001_my_103b.authche 
ckdam.pdf; EDUCATION UNDER ARREST, supra note 28, at 15 (reporting that in 2007–2008, 96 percent 
of school-based referrals in Birmingham, Alabama, were for misdemeanors); ARRESTING 
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 24, at 6 (explaining that during the 2004–2005 school year in Florida, 76 
percent of school-based referrals to law enforcement were for misdemeanor offenses such as 
disorderly conduct); see also TONY FABELO ET AL., COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR. & PUB. 
POLICY RESEARCH INST., TEX. A&M UNIV., BREAKING SCHOOLS’ RULES: A STATEWIDE STUDY OF 
HOW SCHOOL DISCIPLINE RELATES TO STUDENTS’ SUCCESS AND JUVENILE JUSTICE INVOLVEMENT 37 
(2011), available at http://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Breaking_Schools_ 
Rules_Report_Final.pdf [hereinafter BREAKING SCHOOLS’ RULES] (reporting that 97.3 percent of 
suspensions and expulsions in Texas resulted from offenses that did not require suspension or 
expulsion under law); MARK A. GREENWALD, FLA. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, DELINQUENCY IN 
FLORIDA’S SCHOOLS: A SEVEN-YEAR STUDY (2004–05 THROUGH 2010–11) 8 (2011), available at 
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/media/publications/fl_dept_of_juvenile_justice_study_on_delinquen
cy_in_fl_schools_2004-2011.pdf (observing that “disorderly conduct” was the second most common 
school-related delinquency referral in Florida schools from 2010 to 2011); S.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE 
JUSTICE, 2012-2013 ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT 5 (2013), available at http://www.state.sc.us/ 
djj/pdfs/2012-13%20Annual%20Statistical%20Report.pdf (stating that the third most frequent offense 
associated with referrals to family court in 2012–2013 was “disturbing schools”). 
 109. NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, supra note 104, at 5–6; Noguera, supra note 107, at 
342.  
 110. See Michelle Fine et al., Civics Lessons: The Color and Class of Betrayal, 106 TEACHERS C. 
REC. 2193, 2204–05 (2004) (finding that students believed that their teachers considered them to be 
“animals,” “inmates,” or “killers”); Hirschfield, supra note 43, at 92 (“Owing to a dominant image of 
black males as criminals and prisoners, many school authorities view chronically disobedient black 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss4/6
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officials also are influenced by unconscious bias towards minority 
students.
111
 In addition, there is another powerful, systemic force at work: 
the failure of our nation to provide adequate resources for schools to 
properly educate the growing number of students with acute needs.
112
  
 
 
boys as ‘bound for jail’ and ‘unsalvageable.’”); Noguera, supra note 52, at 448 (observing that black 
students were less inclined than white students to believe that their teachers were concerned about and 
supported them).  
 111. While not a primary focus of this Article, the implicit bias of educators is a problem that our 
nation must address because of its contribution to the racial disproportionalities relating to school 
discipline. See Jamilia J. Blake et al., Challenging Middle-Class Notions of Femininity: The Cause of 
Black Females’ Disproportionate Suspension Rates, in CLOSING THE SCHOOL DISCIPLINE GAP, supra 
note 106, at 75, 76 (“Although a number of factors are believed to contribute to disproportionate 
disciplinary practices, racial/ethnic bias has been implicated most frequently . . . .”); Pamela Fenning 
& Jennifer Rose, Overrepresentation of African American Students in Exclusionary Discipline: The 
Role of School Policy, 42 URB. EDUC. 536, 537 (2007) (explaining that students of color are targeted 
by teachers out of fear and anxiety of losing control of the classroom); Kent McIntosh et al., Education 
Not Incarceration: A Conceptual Model for Reducing Racial and Ethnic Disproportionality in School 
Discipline, 5 J. APPLIED RES. ON CHILD. 1, 4, 6 (2014) (stating that conscious or unconscious bias is an 
important factor in the discipline gap); L. Song Richardson, Police Efficiency and the Fourth 
Amendment, 87 IND. L.J. 1143, 1146–47 (2012) (maintaining that individuals have nonconscious 
reactions to others that negatively influence their decisions and behaviors toward those individuals); cf. 
Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not Yet Post-Racial Society, 
91 N.C. L. REV. 1555, 1570 (2013) (“Despite our largely egalitarian attitudes and beliefs, social 
science research over the past decade has shown that a majority of Americans are implicitly biased 
against Blacks.”). It also contributes to racial disparities relating to academic achievement. See Clark 
McKown & Rhona S. Weinstein, Teacher Expectations, Classroom Context, and the Achievement 
Gap, 46 J. SCH. PSYCH. 235, 256 (2008) (demonstrating empirically that teachers with high prejudicial 
attitudes towards minority students experienced higher gaps in student achievement along racial lines 
than teachers with lower biases); Harriet R. Tenenbaum & Martin D. Ruck, Are Teachers’ 
Expectations Different for Racial Minority Than for European American Students? A Meta-Analysis, 
99 J. EDUC. PSYCH. 253, 271 (2007) (observing that teachers have higher expectations for white 
students than for minority students, and that teacher expectancies may lead to differences in academic 
performances); Linda van den Bergh et al., The Implicit Prejudiced Attitudes of Teachers: Relations to 
Teacher Expectations and the Ethnic Achievement Gap, 47 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 497, 518 (2010) 
(observing empirically that teachers with negative attitudes towards ethnic minorities viewed those 
students as less intelligent and less capable of obtaining promising school career prospects, and student 
achievement differences between ethnic minority students and other students were larger in classrooms 
with prejudiced teachers than with teachers who held less prejudicial attitudes); see also CHERYL 
STAATS, KIRWAN INST. FOR THE STUDY OF RACE AND ETHNICITY, THE OHIO STATE UNIV., STATE OF 
THE SCIENCE: IMPLICIT BIAS REVIEW 2013 30–34 (2013). Elsewhere, I propose strategies for schools 
to address implicit racial biases when disciplining students that also may contribute to a broader 
strategy to address biases relating to academic achievement as well. See Nance, Dismantling the 
School-to-Prison Pipeline, supra note 16.  
 112. See LINDA DARLING-HAMMOND, THE FLAT WORLD AND EDUCATION 27–65 (2010) 
(maintaining that students with the greatest needs often learn in disadvantaged educational 
environments); GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV., 
RACIAL TRANSFORMATION AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF SEGREGATION 29–31 (2006), available at 
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED500822.pdf (describing the inequitable learning environments that 
minority students living in concentrated poverty often confront); Derek W. Black, Middle-Income 
Peers as Educational Resources and the Constitutional Right to Equal Access, 53 B.C. L. REV. 373, 
404–09 (2012) (explaining that disadvantaged students often receive an inferior education); James E. 
Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249 (1999) (discussing educational resource 
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Educators, particularly those who work in schools located in 
impoverished areas, serve large percentages of students who face language 
barriers; have health problems; are neglected; live in abusive, 
dysfunctional home environments; suffer from malnutrition; lack early 
learning opportunities; and have severe learning disabilities.
113
 Indeed, the 
effects of poverty on children are devastating.
114
 Several empirical studies 
demonstrate that growing up in poverty is significantly correlated with 
severe cognitive impairments and poor academic achievement.
115
 Yet, 
educators working in these distressed environments more often have fewer 
resources to adequately teach their students.
116
 Education scholar Pedro 
Noguera maintains that it is the acute needs of students and the inability of 
 
 
inequalities for disadvantaged students). Moreover, as many scholars have observed, legislators have 
diverted needed funds for education to the criminal justice system. See, e.g., Garrett Albert Duncan, 
Urban Pedagogies and the Celling of Adolescents of Color, 27 SOC. JUST. 29, 33–34 (2000) 
(explaining that from 1993 to 1995, California decreased spending for primary and secondary schools 
by over 7 percent and for higher education institutions by just under 5 percent but increased its 
spending on corrections by over 43 percent); Giroux, supra note 43, at 559 (noting that operating 
budgets for public education institutions in New York between 1988 and 1998 dropped by 29 percent, 
while funding for prisons increased by 76 percent); Hirschfield, supra note 43, at 90 (observing that 
“the criminal justice boom diverted public funds that could have been directed at public education”). 
 113. Noguera, supra note 107, at 342; see also ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 112, at 29–30. 
 114. See Myron Orfield, Land Use and Housing Policies to Reduce Concentrated Poverty and 
Racial Segregation, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 877, 881–84 (2006) (providing examples of the negative 
impacts poverty has on students’ educational development and their ultimate success as adults); Dowd, 
supra note 28, at 1211 (detailing the harmful effects of poverty on children, including cognitive 
impairment, malnutrition, and health problems). 
 115. See, e.g., Martha J. Farah et al., Childhood Poverty: Specific Associations with 
Neurocognitive Development, 1110 BRAIN RES. 166, 166, 169 (2006) (finding that childhood poverty 
results in “disparities in working memory, cognitive control and especially in language and memory”); 
James E. Ryan, Poverty as Disability and the Future of Special Education Law, 101 GEO. L.J. 1455, 
1478–91 (2013) (explaining that cognitive disparities correlate with socioeconomic status); Dowd, 
supra note 28, at 1211 (“Poverty impacts early development, which is critical to later functioning.”); 
see also Nance & Madsen, supra note 28, at 290–91. A recent study by Professor Patrick Sharkey 
went even further, explaining that children from families that lived in poor neighborhoods for two 
generations scored significantly lower on reading and language ability tests than children who lived in 
poor neighborhoods for only one generation even after accounting for other important factors. See 
PATRICK SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE: URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE END OF PROGRESS TOWARD 
RACIAL EQUALITY 129 (2013). 
 116. See DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 112, at 27–65 (explaining that disadvantaged students 
often have unequal access to needed resources); Gary Orfield, The Growth of Segregation: African 
Americans, Latinos, and Unequal Education, in DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET 
REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 53, 67–69 (Gary Orfield & Susan E. Eaton eds., 1996) 
(observing that “disadvantaged students face more barriers and receive less reinforcement to succeed 
in school”); Osamudia R. James, White Like Me: The Negative Impact of the Diversity Rationale on 
White Identity Formation, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 425, 472 (2014) (maintaining that majority-minority 
schools often have limited access to adequate resources).  
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schools to meet those needs that cause students to become disruptive and 
sometimes dangerous at school.
117
  
School officials and teachers are aware that students who struggle 
academically or have acute needs tend to be more disruptive at school.
118
 
And while there are many dedicated teachers facing these conditions who 
work tirelessly to divert as many students as possible from the criminal 
justice system, there are others who believe that they lack the resources to 
meet the needs of all their troubled, disruptive students and adopt an 
exclusionary ethos to preserve their limited resources for the students 
whom they believe have a better chance of success.
119
 Accordingly, 
schools serving large numbers of struggling students often rely on extreme 
forms of discipline, punishment, and control.
120
 Sociologist Paul 
Hirschfield sums up the issue as follows:  
[As] [t]eachers are often bereft of not only sufficient resources but 
also a cogent narrative of opportunity that can help them gain 
voluntary compliance from students . . . it is understandable that 
teachers and administrators often perceive little choice but to 
summon repressive means to swiftly remove disruptive students 
from the classroom and the school. Criminal justice offers a useful 
template and accessible tools for this purpose.
121
  
II. LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS IN SCHOOLS 
A key, yet understudied, component of the Pipeline is the increased 
presence of law enforcement officers in schools. Law enforcement officers 
have interacted with and provided services to schools for decades.
122
 
 
 
 117. Noguera, supra note 107, at 342.  
 118. Id.; Nance, School Surveillance and the Fouth Amendment, supra note 16, at 101. 
 119. Nance, School Surveillance and the Fouth Amendment, supra note 16, at 101; see also 
NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, supra note 104, at 5 (“[T]he lack of sufficient resources in our 
schools also creates perverse incentives for school officials to remove children from school.”); 
Hirschfield, supra note 43, at 92 (observing that some educators rely on extreme methods of 
punishment and control because they believe that they “lack the resources to reverse the downward 
trajectories of the most troublesome students without compromising the quality of teaching and 
services aimed at more deserving or promising students”).  
 120. NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, supra note 104, at 5; see also Noguera, supra note 107, 
at 345 (observing that schools that serve large numbers of academically unsuccessful students often 
operate more like prisons than schools, using extreme forms of discipline, punishment, and control); 
Nance, School Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, supra note 16, at 102.  
 121. Hirschfield, supra note 43, at 93 (citation omitted).  
 122. See Paul J. Hirschfield & Katarzyna Celinska, Beyond Fear: Sociological Perspectives on the 
Criminalization of School Discipline, 5 SOC. COMPASS 1, 1 (2011); JAMES & MCCALLION, supra note 
37, at 2. These traditional services include visible patrols, criminal investigations, and responses to 
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However, the practice of having law enforcement officers, or school 
resource officers (“SROs”),123 regularly present in schools on a large scale 
is a relatively new phenomenon and is part and parcel of the larger overall 
movement towards criminalizing school discipline.
124
 In the late 1970s 
there were fewer than one hundred police officers in our public schools,
125
 
but this number grew significantly in the years that followed. According to 
the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ Law Enforcement Management and 
Administrative Statistics survey, in 1997 there were approximately 12,300 
SROs employed by local law enforcement agencies nationwide.
126
 In 
2003, the number of full time SROs jumped to 19,900.
127
 In 2007, the 
number of SROs dropped slightly to 19,088.
128
 SRO programs vary from 
state to state, county to county, and even district to district.
129
 In some 
states and counties, police agencies assign SROs to schools, either by 
request of school district officials or by the police agencies.
130
 In a handful 
of states, school districts have the authority to create school district-run 
police departments.
131
  
 
 
calls for service. BARBARA RAYMOND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ASSIGNING POLICE OFFICERS TO 
SCHOOLS 1 (2010), archived at http://perma.cc/8TL5-NGKK. 
 123. According to the Community Oriented Policing Services (“COPS”) program and the Safe 
and Drug-Free Schools and Community Act, an SRO is a “career law enforcement officer, with sworn 
authority, deployed in community-oriented policing, and assigned by the employing police department 
or agency to work in collaboration with schools and community-based organizations.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3796dd-8 (2014); see also 20 U.S.C. § 7161 (2014). SROs typically are sworn police officers 
employed by police departments and assigned to work in schools full-time, but in larger jurisdictions, 
such as Los Angeles or Houston, SROs might be employed by the school districts. See CATHERINE Y. 
KIM & I. INDIA GERONIMO, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, POLICING IN SCHOOLS: DEVELOPING A 
GOVERNANCE DOCUMENT FOR SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICERS IN K-12 SCHOOLS 5 (2009), archived at 
https://perma.cc/27AG-W6HZ. 
 124. See JAMES & MCCALLION, supra note 37, at 2; RAYMOND, supra note 122, at 1; Krezmien et 
al., supra note 64, at 275; Theriot, supra note 11, at 281.  
 125. See Brady et al., supra note 57, at 457; Hirschfield & Celinska, supra note 122, at 1.  
 126. JAMES & MCCALLION, supra note 37, at 19.  
 127. Id.; see also Theriot, supra note 11, at 281 (citation omitted) (“While it is difficult to know 
the exact number of school resource officers, it is estimated that there might be more than 20,000 law 
enforcement officers patrolling schools in the United States.”). 
 128. JAMES & MCCALLION, supra note 37, at 20. It is not clear exactly how many SROs are in 
schools today, but the National Center for Education Statistics estimates that there could be as many as 
30,000. See LUCINDA GRAY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., PUBLIC SCHOOL SAFETY AND DISCIPLINE: 
2013–14 11 (2015). 
 129. See THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, JUSTICE CTR., OFFICERS IN SCHOOLS: A SNAPSHOT OF 
LEGISLATIVE ACTION 1 (2014), archived at https://perma.cc/T4JD-42BW [hereinafter A SNAPSHOT OF 
LEGISLATIVE ACTION]; Brown, supra note 10, at 591. 
 130. See Brown, supra note 10, at 592; A SNAPSHOT OF LEGISLATIVE ACTION, supra note 129, at 
1–2. 
 131. See Brown, supra note 10, at 592; A SNAPSHOT OF LEGISLATIVE ACTION, supra note 129, at 
2; see also KIM & GERONIMO, supra note 123, at 5 (explaining that SROs are sworn police officers 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss4/6
  
 
 
 
 
2016] STUDENTS, POLICE, AND THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE 947 
 
 
 
 
SRO programs are expensive.
132
 A rough estimate of the cost of 
employing 19,088 full-time SROs is almost $619 million a year.
133
 To put 
an SRO in every public school, as some recommend,
134
 would cost 
approximately $3.2 billion each year.
135
 Despite this high cost, federal and 
state governments have encouraged the use of law enforcement and other 
strict security measures in schools by passing laws granting money for 
these purposes. For example, the US Department of Justice’s Community 
Oriented Policing Services (“COPS”) program and the Safe and Drug-Free 
Schools and Communities Act have provided millions of dollars for law 
enforcement, metal detectors, surveillance cameras, and other deterrent 
and security measures in schools.
136
 Several states also have their own 
programs to fund these strict measures in schools, even prior to the 
Newtown shootings.
137
 Powerful networks of criminal justice 
professionals often support and promote these federal and state funding 
initiatives.
138
 
Although lawmakers, police departments, and school officials 
expanded SRO programs to enhance school safety in the wake of rising 
juvenile crime rates and high-profile school shootings,
139
 they made these 
 
 
typically employed by police departments and assigned to work in schools full-time, but in larger 
jurisdictions, such as Los Angeles or Houston, SROs might be employed by the school districts).  
 132. JAMES & MCCALLION, supra note 37, at 20.  
 133. See id. 
 134. See Remarks from the NRA Press Conference on Sandy Hook Shooting, supra note 34.  
 135. See JAMES & MCCALLION, supra note 37, at 20. The average minimum salary for an entry-
level police officer is $32,412. Id. 
 136. See 20 U.S.C. § 7115(b)(2)(E)(ii), (vi) (2014) (authorizing funding for metal detectors, 
electronic locks, surveillance cameras, and SROs); OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2011 SECURE OUR SCHOOLS PROGRAM 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/2011AwardDocs/CSPP-SOS-CHP/SOSMethodology.pdf; JAMES & 
MCCALLION, supra note 37, at 7–8.  
 137. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 41-15B-2.2 (2014); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-1185 (2015); 24 PA. 
CONS. STAT. § 13-1302-A (2011).  
 138. See Hirschfield & Celinska, supra note 122, at 6. The school security market has become 
increasingly profitable for many private companies over the last two decades, and forecasters expect 
that market to continue expanding. See Lizbet Simmons, Profiting from Punishment: Public Education 
and the School Security Market, 41 SOC. JUST. 81, 88–92 (2015) (explaining that school security 
market sales increased from $328 million in 1996 to $3 billion in 2013 and are expected to reach $5 
billion by 2017). 
 139. See JAMES & MCCALLION, supra note 37, at 5; Brown, supra note 10, at 591; Theriot, supra 
note 11, at 280. In 2002, the US Department of Justice sponsored a survey of school principals 
nationwide to ascertain the reasons why schools had established SRO programs. See LAWRENCE F. 
TRAVIS III & JULIE KIERNAN COON, CTR. FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH, UNIV. OF CINCINNATI, 
THE ROLE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT IN PUBLIC SCHOOL SAFETY: A NATIONAL SURVEY (2005), archived 
at https://perma.cc/MSH6-8XS2. The responses were mixed. Principals indicated that “[n]ational 
media attention about school violence” (24.5%) and “[d]isorder problems (e.g., rowdiness, 
vandalism)” (17.5%) were the reasons behind establishing the program. Id. at 84–85. Interestingly, the 
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decisions without thoroughly evaluating the effectiveness of SRO 
programs.
140
 In fact, very few studies have reliably evaluated whether 
SRO programs actually enhance school safety.
141
 According to a recent 
Congressional Research Service Report:  
The body of research on the effectiveness of SRO programs is 
noticeably limited, both in terms of the number of studies published 
and the methodological rigor of the studies conducted. The research 
that is available draws conflicting conclusions about whether SRO 
programs are effective at reducing school violence. In addition, the 
research does not address whether SRO programs deter school 
shootings, one of the key reasons for renewed congressional interest 
in these programs.
142
 
In addition, lawmakers and school officials expanded SRO programs 
despite the potentially harmful effects that SROs may have on the 
educational setting.
143
 For example, strict security measures in and of 
themselves can harm the educational climate by alienating students and 
 
 
most common response was “[o]ther,” which included reasons such as receiving a grant, “part of 
community policing,” “part of a drug awareness program,” “to improve school safety,” and “to build 
relationships with students.” Id. Only 3.7% of respondents indicated that the level of violence in the 
school was the reason for establishing an SRO program. Id. 
 140. See JAMES & MCCALLION, supra note 37, at 9; Brown, supra note 10, at 592 (observing that 
despite the enormous expense associated with SRO programs, it is not clear whether SROs enhance 
student safety); Theriot, supra note 11, at 280.  
 141. See JAMES & MCCALLION, supra note 37, at 9; Theriot, supra note 11, at 280.  
 142. JAMES & MCCALLION, supra note 37, at 10–11; see also Theriot, supra note 11, at 280 
(citations omitted) (“Empirical evaluations of these various security strategies are limited, have 
varying levels of methodological rigor, and often report conflicting findings.”). Another summary of 
the research on the effectiveness of SRO programs states: 
Studies of SRO effectiveness that have measured actual safety outcomes have mixed results. 
Some show an improvement in safety and a reduction in crime; others show no change. 
Typically, studies that report positive results from SRO programs rely on participants’ 
perceptions of the effectiveness of the program rather than on objective evidence. Other 
studies fail to isolate incidents of crime and violence, so it is impossible to know whether the 
positive results stem from the presence of SROs or are the result of other factors. 
RAYMOND, supra note 122, at 8. 
 143. See Brown, supra note 10, at 592 (lamenting that such little attention has been devoted to 
measuring the impact SROs have on the school environment); Theriot, supra note 11, at 281 
(observing that the research on SROs rarely discusses criminalization of school discipline or provides 
data about arrests). 
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generating mistrust,
144
 which, paradoxically, may lead to even more 
disorder and violence.
145
  
Furthermore, putting more SROs in schools may involve more students 
in the criminal justice system, even for low-level violations of school 
behavioral codes.
146
 Indeed, perhaps the most significant challenge of 
having SROs in schools is that while SROs may be in schools primarily to 
enhance school safety, many SROs also become involved in student 
disciplinary matters that educators traditionally have handled and should 
continue to handle.
147
 It is easy to see how this happens. Most SROs spend 
their time each day patrolling buildings and grounds, investigating 
complaints, minimizing disruptions, and maintaining order.
148
 When SROs 
 
 
 144. See Ending the School-to-Prison Pipeline: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, 
Civil Rights and Human Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 1–4 (2012) (testimony 
of Edward Ward, Volunteer, Blocks Together, Dignity in Schools Campaign), archived at 
http://perma.cc/CJ2D-FLN2 (describing his school environment as “very tense,” “antagonizing,” and 
“dishearten[ing],” where “the halls were full with school security officers whose only purpose seemed 
to be to serve students with detentions or suspensions”); Paul Hirschfield, School Surveillance in 
America: Disparate and Unequal, in SCHOOLS UNDER SURVEILLANCE, supra note 54, at 38, 46 
(observing that strict security measures are “a frequent cause of disunity or discord within the school 
community”); Beger, supra note 41, at 340 (concluding that “aggressive security measures produce 
alienation and mistrust among students”); cf. Tom R. Tyler & Lindsay E. Rankin, Legal Socialization 
and Delinquency, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 
55, at 353, 361 (observing that “surveillance systems have deleterious effects on the social climate of 
groups because their use implies distrust, which decreases people’s ability to feel positively about 
themselves, their groups, and the system itself”).  
 145. See Clifford H. Edwards, Student Violence and the Moral Dimensions of Education, 38 
PSYCHOL. IN THE SCHS. 249, 250 (2001) (stating that “intrusive strategies are likely to undermine the 
trust needed to build cooperative school communities capable of really preventing violence”); 
Matthew J. Mayer & Peter E. Leone, A Structural Analysis of School Violence and Disruption: 
Implications for Creating Safer Schools, 22 EDUC. & TREATMENT OF CHILD. 333, 350, 352 (1999) 
(finding that student disorder and student victimization were higher in schools using strict security 
measures); Pedro A. Noguera, Preventing and Producing Violence: A Critical Analysis of Responses 
to School Violence, 65 HARV. EDUC. REV. 189, 190–91 (1995) (observing that the “get tough” 
approach undermines school safety because coercive measures create mistrust and resistance among 
students); Matthew P. Steinberg et al., supra note 106, at 127–29 (finding that students and teachers 
reported lower levels of perceived safety in schools that had higher suspension rates, even after 
controlling for community and contextual variables).  
 146. See infra Parts III–IV; see also FERGUSON INVESTIGATION, supra note 10, at 37–38 (finding 
that the Ferguson, Missouri, Police Department treated “routine discipline issues as criminal matters”). 
 147. See Brown, supra note 10, at 591; FERGUSON INVESTIGATION, supra note 10, at 37–38. 
 148. See JAMES & MCCALLION, supra note 37, at 2; Theriot, supra note 11, at 281. According to 
the COPS program, an SRO’s duties include the following: 
(A) to address crime and disorder problems, gangs, and drug activities affecting or occurring 
in or around an elementary or secondary school; (B) to develop or expand crime prevention 
efforts for students; (C) to educate likely school-age victims in crime prevention and safety; 
(D) to develop or expand community justice initiatives for students; (E) to train students in 
conflict resolution, restorative justice, and crime awareness; (F) to assist in the identification 
of physical changes in the environment that may reduce crime in or around the school; and 
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observe students being disruptive and disorderly, they intervene because 
they view this as one of their duties, even when those duties overlap with 
the traditional duties of school officials.
149
 Furthermore, SROs apparently 
have the legal authority to intervene in almost all student disciplinary 
matters. For example, most states have criminal laws that prohibit assault, 
disorderly conduct, larceny, and disturbing the peace,
150
 and several states 
have passed statutes that explicitly criminalize the disruption of school 
activities
151
 or talking back to teachers.
152
 Accordingly, if a student is 
involved in a scuffle with another student, talks back to a teacher, yells at 
another student, steals another student’s pencil, or exhibits other types of 
poor behavior, SROs have legal authority to arrest that student, even a six-
year old student who is throwing a temper tantrum.
153
 Thus, in many 
schools, SROs have become the “new authoritative agents” of 
discipline.
154
 
The problems with SROs handling student disciplinary issues are 
multifaceted. Whereas teachers and school officials have advanced 
academic credentials, receive training in child psychology, discipline, 
pedagogy, and educational theory, and are accountable to local school 
 
 
(G) to assist in developing school policy that addresses crime and to recommend procedural 
changes.  
42 U.S.C. § 3796dd-8(4) (2014). 
 149. Interestingly, the SRO handbook developed by COPS provides an example of an SRO who 
“once had to threaten to arrest a principal for interfering with a police officer in the performance of his 
duty when the administrator was physically barring [the SRO] from arresting a student,” reminding 
SROs that they have the power to arrest students over the objections of school officials. OFFICE OF 
CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A GUIDE TO DEVELOPING, MAINTAINING, 
AND SUCCEEDING WITH YOUR SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER PROGRAM 51 (2005), available at 
http://perma.cc/235W-UCTT. 
 150. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 241 (West 2014) (prohibiting assault); FLA. STAT. § 877.03 
(2015) (prohibiting acts that breach the peace and disorderly conduct); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.05 
(McKinney 2015) (prohibiting larceny); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-415 (2015) (prohibiting disorderly 
conduct). 
 151. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2911 (2015); CAL. PENAL CODE § 415.5 (West 2014); FLA. 
STAT. § 871.01 (2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 40 (2015); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 392.910 
(West 2015); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-420 (2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-32-6 (2015); TEX. 
EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.123 (West 2015); WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.635.030 (2015); W. VA. CODE 
§ 61-6-14 (2015). 
 152. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-507 (2015); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-17-106(a) (2015); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 18-916 (2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-4-303 (2015); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15.1-06-16 
(2015).  
 153. See Herbert, supra note 13 (reporting the arrest of a six-year-old student for throwing a 
temper tantrum at school).  
 154. Brown, supra note 10, at 591.  
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boards,
155
 SROs are trained in law enforcement, have little or no training 
in developmental psychology or pedagogy, and are not accountable to 
school boards.
156
 Thus, an SRO’s decision to arrest a student may be based 
on criteria that are wholly distinct from and even anathema to the best 
interests of the student or the school as a whole.
157
 As noted above, the 
anecdotal evidence of SROs mishandling student discipline problems 
abounds.
158
 In its investigation of the Ferguson, Missouri, Police 
Department, the US Department of Justice recently determined the 
following: 
SROs’ propensity for arresting students demonstrates a lack of 
understanding of the negative consequences associated with such 
arrests. In fact, SROs told us that they viewed increased arrests in 
the schools as a positive result of their work. This perspective 
suggests a failure of training (including training in mental health, 
counseling, and the development of the teenage brain); a lack of 
priority given to de-escalation and conflict resolution; and 
insufficient appreciation for the negative educational and long-term 
outcomes that can result from treating disciplinary concerns as 
crimes and using force on students.
159
  
The negative effect of SROs and other laws, policies, and practices that 
contribute to the Pipeline certainly have not gone unnoticed by the public, 
and there were signs that changes could be underway.
160
 However, the 
brutal Newtown shootings have caused lawmakers and school officials to 
enact a new set of laws and policies designed to protect students from 
intruders, but that may have the unintended consequence of involving 
 
 
 155. This does not imply that teachers and school officials do not need more training in these 
areas. In fact, as previously noted, too many school officials and teachers rely too heavily on overly 
punitive disciplinary methods. It is critical for school officials and teachers to become aware of and 
support using alternative methods to create safe, supportive learning environments. See infra Part V.B; 
see also Nance, Dismantling the School-to-Prison Pipeline, supra note 16.  
 156. Brown, supra note 10, at 591. 
 157. Id.; FERGUSON INVESTIGATION, supra note 10, at 38.  
 158. See supra notes 2–14 and accompanying text; see also BELWAY, supra note 11, at 4, 6; 
FERGUSON INVESTIGATION, supra note 10, at 37–38; AARON KUPCHIK, HOMEROOM SECURITY: 
SCHOOL DISCIPLINE IN AN AGE OF FEAR 94–95, 115 (2010) (describing an officer’s demand for 
harsher punishment than what was originally imposed by the school official); Kaitlin Banner, Breaking 
the School-to-Prison Pipeline: New Models for School Discipline and Community Accountable 
Schools, in TOTAL REFORM FOR A BROKEN SYSTEM, supra note 22, at 301, 302–03 (describing other 
events of SROs mishandling student disciplinary issues). 
 159. FERGUSON INVESTIGATION, supra note 10, at 38. 
 160. See supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text; see also Kerrin C. Wolf, Booking Students: 
An Analysis of School Arrests and Court Outcomes, 9 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 58, 59 (2013). 
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more students in the justice system. For example, just over a month after 
the Newtown shootings, President Obama presented a plan to protect 
children that included providing $150 million to school districts and law 
enforcement agencies to hire, among other individuals, SROs.
161
 Since the 
Newtown shootings, the US Department of Justice’s COPS Hiring 
Program has continued to provide monetary awards to school districts to 
hire SROs.
162
 In addition, since the Newtown shootings, several states 
have enacted legislation designed to put more police officers in schools.
163
 
While the outcome of these new laws remains unclear, one can examine 
the data that are currently available to begin to understand the potential 
harm that these new laws may have on students.  
III. THE IMPACT OF THESE LAWS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES ON 
STUDENTS 
One cannot measure with precision the combined effect of all of these 
laws, policies, and practices on students. Nevertheless, there is objective 
evidence indicating their significant negative influence. For example, the 
number of students suspended or expelled in secondary schools 
nationwide increased from one in thirteen in 1972–1973 to one in nine in 
2009–2010.164 Many of these suspensions and expulsions resulted from 
 
 
 161. THE WHITE HOUSE, NOW IS THE TIME: THE PRESIDENT’S PLAN TO PROTECT OUR CHILDREN 
AND OUR COMMUNITIES BY REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE 11 (2013), archived at http://perma.cc/9HBA-
5XFV. 
 162. See 2013 Grantee Award Package, OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/print.asp?Item=2700 (last visited Jan. 7, 2016), 
archived at http://perma.cc/8R24-4QS7; 2014 Grantee Award Package, OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED 
POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Default.asp?Item=2738 (last 
visited Jan. 7, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/NKS5-FZQ5.  
 163. See A SNAPSHOT OF LEGISLATIVE ACTION, supra note 129, at 1–2. Other states are 
considering legislation that would put more law enforcement officers in schools. See id.; see also Nirvi 
Shah & Andrew Ujifusa, School Safety Legislation Since Newtown, EDUC. WEEK (Apr. 24, 2013), 
http://www.edweek.org/ew/section/multimedia/school-safety-bills-since-newtown.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/2DK2-RABG.  
 164. KANG-BROWN ET AL., supra note 53, at 2. Between 1974 and 1997, the number of 
suspensions nationally increased from 1.7 million to 3.1 million. NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, 
supra note 104, at 3; see also Johanna Wald & Daniel J. Losen, Defining and Redirecting a School-to-
Prison Pipeline, 2003 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR YOUTH DEV. 9, 10 (reporting that the number of 
suspensions has doubled nationwide since 1974). During the 2011–2012 school year, approximately 
3.5 million students received an in-school suspension; 1.9 million students received a single out-of-
school suspension; 1.55 million students received multiple out-of-school suspensions; and 130,000 
students were expelled. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., CIVIL RIGHTS DATA 
COLLECTION, DATA SNAPSHOT: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 2 (2014), archived at http://perma.cc/KUU8-
3ES5 [hereinafter DATA SNAPSHOT: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE]. 
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only trivial infractions of school rules or offenses, not from offenses that 
endangered the physical well-being of other students.
165
  
There is also evidence that school-based referrals to law enforcement 
have increased.
166
 For example, in North Carolina, the number of school-
based referrals increased by 10 percent from 2008 to 2013.
167
 In an 
empirical study to compare referrals across multiple states,
168
 researchers 
Michael Krezmien, Peter Leone, Mark Zablocki, and Craig Wells found 
that in four of the five states studied (Arizona, Hawaii, Missouri, and West 
Virginia), referrals from schools comprised a larger proportion of total 
referrals to the juvenile justice system in 2004 than in 1995.
169
 That study 
also demonstrated that schools in Missouri, Hawaii, and Arizona referred 
greater proportions of their students in 2004 than in 1995.
170
 The number 
of school-based arrests also increased in the Philadelphia Public School 
District (from 1,632 in 1999–2000 to 2,194 in 2002–2003);171 Houston 
Independent School District (from 1,063 in 2001 to 4,002 in 2002);
172
 
Clayton County, Georgia (from 89 in the 1990s to 1,400 in 2004);
173
 
Miami-Dade County, Florida (a threefold increase from 1999 to 2001, and 
 
 
 165. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 108, at 2 (explaining that students have been suspended or 
expelled for shooting a paperclip with a rubber band or bringing a manicure kit to school); FABELO ET 
AL., supra note 108, at 37 (reporting that 97.3 percent of suspensions and expulsions in Texas resulted 
from offenses that did not require suspension or expulsion under law); Daniel J. Losen, Sound 
Discipline Policy for Successful Schools: How Redressing Racial Disparities Can Make a Positive 
Impact for All, in DISRUPTING THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE 45, 54–55 (Sofía Bahena et al. eds., 
2012) (explaining that the vast majority of suspensions and expulsions are for minor offenses); Are 
Zero Tolerance Policies Effective in the Schools?, supra note 58, at 852 (explaining that a ten-year-old 
girl was expelled because her mother put a small knife in her lunchbox to cut up an apple, and another 
student was expelled for talking on a cell phone to his mother who was on deployment as a solider to 
Iraq and with whom he had not spoken for thirty days).  
 166. Although precise national data are not available, see EDUCATION ON LOCKDOWN, supra note 
19, at 15, the US Department of Education has provided national estimates for the total number of 
students referred to law enforcement and the total number of school-based arrests. See DATA 
SNAPSHOT: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE, supra note 164. According to those estimates, during the 2011–2012 
school year, approximately 260,000 students were referred to law enforcement, and there were 
approximately 92,000 school-based arrests. Id. at 6. 
 167. FROM PUSH OUT TO LOCK UP, supra note 108, at 8–9. 
 168. See EDUCATION UNDER ARREST, supra note 28, at 13. 
 169. Krezmien et al., supra note 64, at 286.  
 170. Id. at 280. Schools from the states of South Carolina and West Virginia referred lower 
proportions of the students in 2004 than in 1995, but there was great variability in referral rates over 
that time period. See id. at 281.  
 171. See EDUCATION ON LOCKDOWN, supra note 19, at 15–16.  
 172. Id.  
 173. See Clayton County, GA, ENDING THE SCHOOLHOUSE TO JAILHOUSE TRACK, 
http://safequalityschools.org/pages/clayton-county-ga (last visited Jan. 11, 2016).  
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from 1,816 in 2001 to 2,566 in 2004);
174
 and Lucas County, Ohio (from 
1,237 in 2000 to 1,727 in 2002).
175
 Similar to the increase of suspensions 
and expulsions, there is substantial evidence that the vast majority of these 
school-based referrals were for relatively minor offenses.
176
 
The negative consequences associated with incarcerating a youth, 
which is where the school-to-prison pipeline may ultimately lead, should 
not be underestimated. Empirical evidence demonstrates that incarcerating 
juveniles limits their future educational, housing, employment, and 
military opportunities.
177
 It also negatively affects a youth’s mental 
health,
178
 reinforces violent attitudes and behavior,
179
 and increases the 
odds of future involvement in the justice system.
180
 As the US Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently observed, “[t]he criminal 
punishment of young schoolchildren leaves permanent scars and 
unresolved anger, and its far-reaching impact on the abilities of these 
children to lead future prosperous and productive lives should be a matter 
of grave concern for us all.”181 
Furthermore, the economic costs of incarcerating students are 
staggering. The national average expense for detaining one juvenile per 
year is $148,767 (reaching as high as $352,663 in the state of New 
York).
182
 And beyond the millions of dollars that government entities 
spend to incarcerate youth, some estimate that the long-term costs to our 
society of detaining youth (which include lost future earnings, recidivism, 
 
 
 174. Sara Rimer, Unruly Students Facing Arrest, Not Detention, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2004), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/04/us/unruly-students-facing-arrest-not-detention.html; ARRESTING 
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 24, at 48.  
 175. Rimer, supra note 174. 
 176. See, e.g., ARRESTING DEVELOPMENT, supra note 24, at 6 (explaining that during the 2004–
2005 school year in Florida, 76 percent of school-based referrals to law enforcement were for 
misdemeanor offenses such as disorderly conduct); EDUCATION UNDER ARREST, supra note 28, at 15 
(reporting that in 2007–2008, 96 percent of school-based referrals in Jefferson County, Alabama, were 
for misdemeanors); FROM PUSH OUT TO LOCK UP, supra note 108, at 9–10 (“Students were most 
commonly referred to the juvenile justice system for low-level offenses.”).  
 177. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 178. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 179. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 180. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.  
 181. Hawker v. Sandy City Corp., 774 F.3d 1243, 1244 (10th Cir. 2014) (Lucero, J., concurring); 
see also N.C. v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.3d 852, 863 (Ky. 2013) (reasoning that the “shift away 
from traditional in-school discipline towards greater reliance on juvenile justice interventions, not just 
in drug cases, but also in common school misbehavior that ends up in the juvenile justice system . . . 
comes at a significant cost to state agencies and takes the student out of the normal education process 
. . . .”).  
 182. See JUSTICE POLICY INST., STICKER SHOCK: CALCULATING THE FULL PRICE TAG FOR YOUTH 
INCARCERATION 11 (2014).  
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lost future tax revenue, and additional Medicare and Medicaid spending) 
range from $7.9 billion to $21.47 billion per year.
183
 
But even if the student is not convicted and incarcerated, an arrest still 
carries severe consequences. Sometimes schools will refuse to readmit 
arrested students.
184
 If arrested students are readmitted, they often face 
emotional trauma, embarrassment, and stigma in their schools and among 
their classmates and teachers.
185
 They may also face increased monitoring 
from teachers, school officials, and SROs.
186
 These conditions often lead 
to lower standardized test scores, a higher likelihood that the student will 
drop out of school, and increased interaction with the justice system.
187
 
Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, criminologist 
Gary Sweeten found that, even after controlling for other relevant factors, 
a first-time arrest during high school almost doubles the odds that a 
student will drop out of school, and a court appearance associated with an 
arrest nearly quadruples those odds.
188
 In another study involving inner-
city students, most of whom lived in minority-dominated neighborhoods 
in Chicago, sociologist Paul Hirschfield found that those who were 
 
 
 183. Id. at 36.  
 184. EDUCATION ON LOCKDOWN, supra note 19, at 12. 
 185. Id.; Theriot, supra note 11, at 280–81. For example, a twelve-year-old African-American 
girl, Mikia Hutchings, was a quiet, focused, hard-working student who normally followed the rules. 
Tanzina Vega, Disciplining of Girls Differs Among and Within Races, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2014, at 
A21. Mikia was caught writing the word “hi” on the gym bathroom wall with her friend. Id. After 
being suspended from school, a police officer visited Mikia’s home, accusing her of a trespassing 
misdemeanor and potentially a felony. Id. As part of an agreement to dismiss the suit after she could 
not pay the $100 fine, Mikia spent her summer on probation subject to a 7 p.m. curfew and completed 
community service hours. Id. The other student, who is white, was let go after paying the $100 fine. Id. 
According to Mikia’s grandmother, Mikia suffered from emotional distress after her dealings with the 
officer. Id. at A23. In another example, a seventeen-year-old African-American female student was 
expelled from high school after being accused of hitting a white male student with a book. Id. Criminal 
charges were filed against her. Id. Before the incident, she had been doing well academically and had 
been involved in extracurricular activities. Id. After the incident, feeling like she was treated unfairly, 
the student became suicidal and began cutting herself with soda can tops. Id.  
 186. Theriot, supra note 11, at 280–81. For example, when a middle school student from Chicago 
was arrested for walking past a fight that broke out, she claimed that this event changed her entire 
educational experience. See Banner, supra note 158, at 301, 302. That student observed: “Even though 
I had good grades, my teachers treated me differently after that. They saw me as someone who got into 
fights and got arrested. They didn’t want to let me graduate, eat lunch with my class, or go on our class 
trip even though I hadn’t done anything. It showed me that the world wasn’t fair.” Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 187. See KIM ET AL., supra note 16, at 113, 128. Further, one must not forget the strain that 
increased arrests have on our justice system. Judges, prosecutors, and public defenders have 
complained that they are devoting scarce resources to handle school arrests that could be handled more 
effectively and efficiently by school officials. See id.; KIM & GERONIMO, supra note 123, at 10–11; 
Wolf, supra note 160, at 80. 
 188. Sweeten, supra note 19, at 473.  
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arrested in ninth or tenth grade were six to eight times more likely than 
students who were not arrested to drop out of high school.
189
 These results 
held firm even after controlling for other demographic, behavioral, and 
academic variables.
190
  
One also should not underestimate the negative impact of suspending 
or expelling a student. Excluding a student from school,
191
 even for a short 
time period, disrupts that student’s educational experience and provides 
that student with more time and opportunities to engage in harmful or 
illegal activities.
192
 Ample studies demonstrate that a suspended student is 
less likely to advance to the next grade level or enroll in college and is 
more likely to drop out, commit a crime, get arrested, and become 
incarcerated as an adult.
193
  
 
 
 189. Paul Hirschfield, Another Way Out: The Impact of Juvenile Arrests on High School Dropout, 
82 SOC. OF EDUC. 368, 368 (2009).  
 190. Id. at 382–85.  
 191. Ironically, empirical studies demonstrate that overly relying on these punitive measures often 
tends to cause more disciplinary problems in the long run for educators. See supra notes 144–45 and 
accompanying text. Scholars Matthew Steinberg, Elaine Allensworth, and David Johnson discovered 
that students and teachers reported lower levels of perceived safety in schools that had higher 
suspension rates, even after controlling for community and school contextual variables. Steinberg et 
al., supra note 106, at 118, 127–29. They explained that these findings, while not demonstrating a 
causal connection, suggested that overly relying on suspensions may aggravate safety problems, even 
in schools located in high-crime/high-poverty neighborhoods. Id. at 128–29. 
 192. See Ending the School-to-Prison Pipeline: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, 
Civil Rights and Human Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 2–3 (2012) (statement 
of Laurel G. Bellows, President, Am. Bar Ass’n), archived at http://perma.cc/N49C-Y7WN 
(explaining how exclusion is an indirect route to involvement in the justice system); American 
Academy of Pediatrics Committee on School Health, Policy Statement: Out-of-School Suspension and 
Expulsion, 112 PEDIATRICS 1206, 1207 (2003) (explaining that when youth are not monitored by 
parents or trained professionals, they are much more likely to commit crimes).  
 193. See Robert Balfanz et al., Sent Home and Put Off Track: The Antecedents, 
Disproportionalities, and Consequences of Being Suspended in the 9th Grade, in CLOSING THE 
SCHOOL DISCIPLINE GAP, supra note 106, at 17, 22–29 (conducting a longitudinal study of 181,897 
Florida students and finding that, after controlling for student demographics and other indicators 
suggesting that a student is not on track to graduate, each suspension decreases the odds that a student 
will graduate by 20 percent); Tracey L. Shollenberger, Racial Disparities in School Suspension and 
Subsequent Outcomes: Evidence from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, in CLOSING THE 
SCHOOL DISCIPLINE GAP, supra note 106, at 31, 36 (finding empirically not only that exclusionary 
discipline negatively affected graduation rates generally, but also that its effect on minorities’ 
graduation rates was particularly severe). As noted previously, students who do not obtain a high 
school diploma are more likely to become incarcerated as adults. See supra note 105 and 
accompanying text. Moreover, in a study tracking Texas students from seventh through twelfth grade, 
researchers discovered that exclusion from school nearly tripled a student’s chances of being involved 
in the juvenile justice system within the subsequent year. BREAKING SCHOOLS’ RULES, supra note 
108, at 70. 
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Another serious ramification of these laws, practices, and policies is 
their disproportionate impact on minority students.
194
 Using a variety of 
measures, racial disparities relating to suspensions, expulsions, referrals to 
law enforcement, and school-based arrests have been documented using 
national-, state-, and local-level data at all school levels across all 
settings.
195
 For example, the US Department of Education’s Office of 
Civil Rights Data Collection demonstrates that although African-American 
students represented only 16% of the total number of students during the 
2011–12 school year, they represented 32% of students receiving an in-
school suspension; 33% of students receiving one out-of-school 
suspension; 42% of students receiving more than one out-of-school 
suspension; and 34% of students who were expelled.
196
 Also during this 
period, African-American students accounted for 27% of the students who 
were referred to law enforcement, and 31% of students who received a 
school-based arrest.
197
 Just as appalling (or perhaps more so), while 
African-Americans accounted for 18% of the preschool student 
population, they represented 48% of the preschool children who received 
more than one out-of-school suspension.
198
 These disparities are not 
explained by more frequent or more serious misbehavior by minority 
students.
199
 According to the Office for Civil Rights, “in our investigations 
we have found cases where African-American students were disciplined 
more harshly and more frequently because of their race than similarly 
situated white students. In short, racial discrimination in school discipline 
is a real problem.”200  
 
 
 194. See DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 16, at 3–4; KIM ET AL., supra note 16, at 80; Are 
Zero Tolerance Policies Effective in the Schools?, supra note 58, at 854–55.  
 195. Russell J. Skiba et al., More Than a Metaphor: The Contribution of Exclusionary Discipline 
to a School-to-Prison Pipeline, 47 EQUITY & EXCELLENCE IN EDUC. 546, 550 (2014). 
 196. DATA SNAPSHOT: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE, supra note 164, at 2; see also OPPORTUNITIES 
SUSPENDED, supra note 67, at 6 (showing that one out of every six black students enrolled in K–12 
public schools has been suspended at least once, but only one out of twenty white students has been 
suspended).  
 197. DATA SNAPSHOT: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE, supra note 164, at 6; see also Wolf, supra note 43, at 
25–26 (finding that African-American students in Delaware accounted for 67% of arrested students 
while comprising only 32% of the student body).  
 198. DATA SNAPSHOT: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE, supra note 164, at 1. 
 199. DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 16, at 4. 
 200. Id. Multiple empirical studies support the Department of Education’s conclusion. See, e.g., 
DANIEL J. LOSEN, NAT’L EDUC. POLICY CTR., DISCIPLINE POLICIES, SUCCESSFUL SCHOOLS, AND 
RACIAL JUSTICE 6–7 (2011); Catherine P. Bradshaw et al., Multilevel Exploration of Factors 
Contributing to the Overrepresentation of Black Students in Office Disciplinary Referrals, 102 J. 
EDUC. PSYCHOL. 508, 508 (2010) (discovering that after controlling for teacher ratings of students’ 
behavior problems, African-American students were more likely than white students to be referred to 
the office for disciplinary reasons); Sean Kelly, A Crisis of Authority in Predominantly Black 
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IV. THE EMPIRICAL STUDY 
As in the past, many lawmakers, police departments, and school 
officials currently seek to put more SROs in schools despite the fact that 
research on the effectiveness of SRO programs is extremely limited.
201
 But 
more importantly, these decisionmakers have not given enough attention 
to the potential negative consequences of bolstering SRO programs, 
including their potential to put more students on a pathway from school to 
prison.
202
 This Article’s empirical study measured the relationship 
between a police officer’s regular presence at a school and the odds that 
 
 
Schools?, 112 TCHRS. C. REC. 1247, 1261–62 (2010) (examining data from teacher surveys and 
finding that when controlling for factors such as low achievement and poverty, African-American 
students were no more disruptive than other students); Anna C. McFadden et al., A Study of Race and 
Gender Bias in the Punishment of Handicapped School Children, 24 URB. REV. 239, 246–47 (1992) 
(finding that African-American male disabled students were punished more severely than other 
students for the same offenses); Michael Rocque & Raymond Paternoster, Understanding the 
Antecedents of the “School-to-Jail” Link: The Relationship Between Race and School Discipline, 101 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 633, 653–54 (2011) (documenting that African-American students are 
more likely than white students to be disciplined even after taking into account other salient factors 
such as grades, attitudes, gender, special education or language programs, and their conduct in school); 
Russell J. Skiba et al., Race Is Not Neutral: A National Investigation of African American and Latino 
Disproportionality in School Discipline, 40 SCH. PSYCHOL. REV. 85, 95–101 (2011) (examining a 
national sample and finding significant school discipline disparities for minorities); Russell J. Skiba et 
al., Where Should We Intervene? Contributions of Behavior, Student, and School Characteristics to 
Out-of-School Suspension, in CLOSING THE SCHOOL DISCIPLINE GAP, supra note 106, at 132–34 
(finding that race was a strong predictor of out-of-school suspensions). 
 201. See JAMES & MCCALLION, supra note 37, at 9. 
 202. However, the limited research that has been conducted is telling. For example, researcher 
Matthew Theriot studied a school district in the southeastern United States that assigned full-time 
SROs to schools residing within the city limits, but not without. See Theriot, supra note 11, at 282. 
Theriot found that schools with SROs were more likely to arrest students for lower-level offenses such 
as disorderly conduct than schools without SROs, but not for more serious crimes. Id. at 284–85. 
Theriot concedes, however, that his findings may not be generalizable because they are based on a 
limited sample in only one school district. Id. at 286. A study conducted by researchers Chongmin Na 
and Denise Gottfredson contained findings consistent with Theriot’s study. Na and Gottfredson 
analyzed national data from the 2006–07 School Survey on Crime and Safety and found that schools 
with SROs reported higher percentages of non-serious offenses to law enforcement than schools that 
did not have SROs. See Chongmin Na & Denise C. Gottfredson, Police Officers in Schools: Effects on 
School Crime and the Processing of Offending Behaviors, 30 JUST. Q. 619, 640 (2013). Researchers 
Mario S. Torres, Jr. and Jacqueline A. Stefkovich analyzed data from the 1999–2000 School Survey on 
Crime and Safety and found that schools that “regularly use[d] law enforcement” reported student 
offenses to the police at higher rates than those schools that did not. See Mario S. Torres Jr. & 
Jacqueline A. Stefkovich, Demographics and Police Involvement: Implications for Student Civil 
Liberties and Just Leadership, 45 EDUC. ADMIN. Q. 450, 461–63 (2009). In a very recent study, 
criminologist Emily G. Owens discovered that police jurisdictions that received federal grants to hire 
more SROs in schools learned about more crimes taking place in schools, and those law enforcement 
agencies were more likely to arrest students who commit crimes in schools. See Emily G. Owens, 
Testing the School-to-Prison Pipeline 18–30 (Univ. of Pa. Dep’t of Criminology, Working Paper No. 
2015-5.1, 2015), available at https://crim.sas.upenn.edu/working-papers/police.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss4/6
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school officials refer students to law enforcement for various offenses, 
including seemingly minor offenses. It differs from prior studies in at least 
two important ways. First, it analyzed restricted data from the 2009–2010 
School Survey on Crime and Safety (“SSOCS”), the most recent, complete 
SSOCS dataset available on this topic. Second, it controlled for other 
important variables that prior studies did not, such as (1) state statutes that 
require schools to report certain incidents to law enforcement, and 
(2) general levels of criminal activity and disorder that occurred in schools 
during that school year, while still controlling for other important 
demographic variables and school characteristics.
203
  
A.  The Data 
The data for the empirical analysis came from the School Survey on 
Crime and Safety for the 2009–2010 school year (“2009–2010 SSOCS”) 
published by the US Department of Education’s National Center for 
Education Statistics (“NCES”).204 The dataset is the restricted-access 
version, meaning that it contains sensitive, detailed information on school 
crime, such as the number of violent incidents that occurred on school 
grounds and the number of incidents that schools reported to law 
enforcement.
205
  
NCES used the 2007–2008 school year Common Core of Data Public 
Elementary/Secondary School Universe File (“CCD”),206 which is the 
 
 
 203. The Na and Gottfredson study, however, did account for general levels of criminal activity, 
but it did not account for school disorder or reporting statutes. It also relied on an older data set. See 
Na & Gottfredson, supra note 202, at 639. 
 204. See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., SCHOOL SURVEY ON CRIME 
AND SAFETY: PRINCIPAL QUESTIONNAIRE, 2009–10 SCHOOL YEAR (2010), available at 
http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/ssocs/pdf/SSOCS_2010_ Questionnaire.pdf [hereinafter 2009–2010 SSOCS 
QUESTIONNAIRE].  
 205. See Statistical Standards Program: Getting Started, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, 
http://nces.ed.gov/statprog/instruct_gettingstarted.asp (last visited Jan. 8, 2016). The restricted-use 
data “have a higher level of detail in the data compared to public-use data files.” Id. The restricted-use 
datasets are not available to the general public. However, datasets that contain less sensitive data can 
be downloaded at http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/ssocs/data_products.asp.  
 206. The Common Core of Data “is an NCES annual census system that collects fiscal and 
nonfiscal data on all public schools, public school districts, and state education agencies in the United 
States.” NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 2009–2010 SCHOOL SURVEY ON 
CRIME AND SAFETY (SSOCS): RESTRICTED-USE DATA FILE USER MANUAL 8 (2011) [hereinafter 
2009–2010 RESTRICTED-USE MANUAL] (on file with author); see also Helen M. Marks & Jason P. 
Nance, Contexts of Accountability Under Systemic Reform: Implications for Principal Influence on 
Instruction and Supervision, 43 EDUC. ADMIN. Q. 3, 10–11 (2007) (describing the Common Core of 
Data). The CCD includes regular schools, charter schools, and schools that have magnet programs in 
the United States. It excludes schools in the US outlying areas, such as American Samoa, Guam, the 
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the US Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico, as well as 
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most complete list of public schools available, as a sampling frame
207
 to 
select schools to participate in the study.
208
 After subdividing the sample 
frame to ensure that subgroups of interest would be adequately 
represented,
209
 NCES randomly selected 3,480 schools to participate in the 
study.
210
 Of these public schools, 2,650 submitted usable questionnaires, 
which is a return rate of 76%.
211
 NCES collected the data from February 
24, 2010, to June 11, 2010.
212
 
B. Dependent Variables 
The 2009–2010 SSOCS restricted-use dataset provides a unique 
opportunity to analyze on a national scale the relationship between a 
police officer’s weekly presence at school and the odds that school 
officials refer students to law enforcement for various offenses. The 2009–
2010 SSOCS asked principals to record the total number of incidents that 
occurred at their school
213
 during the 2009–2010 school year and the total 
number of incidents reported to law enforcement for the following 
offenses: 
 robbery (“taking things by force”) with a weapon; 
 
 
overseas Department of Defense schools, newly closed schools, home schools, Bureau of Indiana 
Education schools, nonregular schools, ungraded schools, and schools with a high grade of 
kindergarten or lower. 2009–2010 RESTRICTED-USE MANUAL, supra note 206, at 8.  
 207. A “sampling frame” is a list of units that could be selected for study. See RICHARD L. 
SCHEAFFER ET AL., ELEMENTARY SURVEY SAMPLING 9 (7th ed. 2011).  
 208. See 2009–2010 RESTRICTED-USE MANUAL, supra note 206, at 8.  
 209. See id. at 9. The sample was stratified by instructional level (e.g., elementary school, middle 
school, high school), locale (e.g., rural, suburb, urban), enrollment size, and region (e.g., Northeast, 
Midwest, South, and West). In addition, the sample frame was stratified by percent of combined 
student population as Black/African American, Hispanic/Latino, Asian, Native Hawaiian/other Pacific 
Islander, or American Indian/Alaska Native. Id.  
 210. Id. at 10. NCES guidelines for using restricted data require that raw numbers be rounded to 
the nearest ten. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T. OF EDUC., RESTRICTED-USE DATA 
PROCEDURES MANUAL 20 (2011), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs96/96860rev.pdf [hereinafter 
RESTRICTED-USE DATA PROCEDURES MANUAL]. 
 211. 2009–2010 RESTRICTED-USE MANUAL, supra note 206, at 1, 9–13. A response rate of 76 
percent is excellent and reduces bias in the data. EARL BABBIE, THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 
256 (9th ed. 2001).  
 212. 2009–2010 RESTRICTED-USE MANUAL, supra note 206, at 1.  
 213. The 2009–2010 SSOCS asked principals to include all incidents that occurred at school, 
regardless of whether students or non-students were involved. See 2009–2010 SSOCS 
QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 204, at 11. Thus, it is possible that some of the incidents recorded related 
to non-students. However, while more precise questions are needed to identify exactly how many 
students were involved, it seems highly likely that the vast majority of cases recorded involved 
students.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss4/6
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 robbery (“taking things by force”) without a weapon; 
 physical attack or fight with a weapon; 
 physical attack or fight without a weapon; 
 threats of physical attack with a weapon; 
 threats of physical attack without a weapon; 
 theft/larceny (“taking things worth over $10 without personal 
confrontation”); 
 possession of a firearm or explosive device; 
 possession of a knife or sharp object; 
 distribution, possession, or use of illegal drugs; 
 distribution, possession, or use of alcohol; and 
 vandalism.214 
I constructed models to predict the odds that school officials refer students 
to law enforcement for committing each of the above offenses.
215
  
C. Independent Variables 
The 2009–2010 SSOCS asked principals to report whether sworn law 
enforcement officers were present at their schools at least once a week.
216
 
 
 
 214. Id. 
 215. Instead of calculating the proportion of the offenses referred to law enforcement for each 
school for each particular offense, if the school reported more than one incident for a particular 
offense, I included each incident as a new variable. By doing it this way no data are lost. See Karen 
Grace-Martin, Proportions as Dependent Variable in Regression–Which Type of Model?, THE 
ANALYSIS FACTOR, http://www.theanalysisfactor.com/proportions-as-dependent-variable-in-
regression-which-type-of-model/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2016). Furthermore, running a regression analysis 
in which the dependent variable is a proportion creates model fit problems because the relationship is 
not linear, but sigmoidal. See id.; see also Fransisco Cribari-Neto & Achim Zeileis, Beta Regression in 
R, 34 J. STAT. SOFTWARE 1, 1–2 (2010), available at http://cran.r-project.org/web/ 
packages/betareg/vignettes/ betareg.pdf. Treating the proportion as a binary response and running a 
logistic regression addresses this problem if a researcher has data for the total number of trials and 
successes. See Grace-Martin, supra. Nevertheless, I note that when I calculated the proportion of 
offenses referred to law enforcement for each school and included those measures as my dependent 
variables (for each category of offenses), the regression analyses did not produce results that differed 
significantly from those I present in Table 2.  
 216. 2009–2010 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 204, at 8. Specifically, the 2009–2010 
SSOCS asked principals to report separately the number of “School Resource Officers,” which 
includes “all career law enforcement officers with arrest authority, who have specialized training and 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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This was the independent variable of primary interest for this study.
217
  
The 2009–2010 SSOCS also contained a number of other variables, 
many of which could influence the odds that schools refer students to law 
enforcement for committing certain offenses. These variables served as 
control variables. For example, the general level of crime that exists at a 
school may influence the odds that school officials refer students to law 
enforcement for committing an offense.
218
 If students engage in many 
illegal activities, school officials might be more inclined to refer more 
students to law enforcement to stabilize the environment.
219
 Further, 
because the odds of referral may change in accordance with the types of 
offenses that occur at school,
220
 I divided the offenses into two categories: 
“weapon/sex offenses” (rape; sexual battery; robbery with a weapon; 
physical attack with a weapon; threat of physical attack with a weapon; 
possession of a firearm or explosive device; and possession of a knife or 
sharp object), and “non-weapon/non-sex offenses” (physical attack 
without a weapon; threats of physical attack without a weapon; theft; drug 
possession; alcohol possession; vandalism; and robbery without a 
weapon). I categorized the offenses in this manner because our current 
legislative landscape indicates a strong proclivity to refer juveniles to the 
justice system for committing sexual crimes and using or bringing 
 
 
are assigned to work in collaboration with school organizations,” and the number of “[s]worn law 
enforcement officers who are not School Resource Officers.” Id. I included in my empirical study only 
schools that indicated that they have either a part-time or full-time school resource officer or sworn 
law enforcement officer present at their school at least once a week.  
 217. While additional information regarding how much time the SROs spent at the schools would 
have been useful for this study, unfortunately the 2009–2010 SSOCS did not contain such information. 
See id. at 8.  
 218. See Kelly Welch & Allison Ann Payne, Racial Threat and Punitive School Discipline, 57 
SOC. PROBS. 25, 27 (2010) (citation omitted) (“One factor presumed to be closely associated with 
school punitiveness and disciplinary practice is the level of school crime and disorder.”); see also 
TRAVIS & COON, supra note 139, at 20; Aaron Kupchik & Geoff K. Ward, Race, Poverty, and 
Exclusionary School Security: An Empirical Analysis of U.S. Elementary, Middle, and High Schools, 
12 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 332 (2014); Nance, Students, Security, and Race, supra note 85, at 
33.  
 219. See Welch & Payne, supra note 218, at 27.  
 220. For example, consistent with the “broken windows” theory, school officials may take a 
harder line against less severe offenses in an effort to deter more serious offenses. See Feld, supra note 
65, at 886–87; see also generally James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police 
and Neighborhood Safety, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
past/docs/politics/crime/windows.htm (theorizing that broken windows, if not fixed, lead to more 
crime because they transmit a message of societal indifference to disorder); Tyler et al., supra note 65, 
at 606–08 (explaining the “broken windows” theory). 
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weapons on school grounds.
221
 I transformed these variables into rates per 
100 students to account for variations in school size.
222
  
The general level of school disorder also may influence the odds of 
referring students to law enforcement.
223
 To control for school disorder, I 
created an index based on several questions in the 2009–2010 SSOCS. 
Principals were asked to rate on a scale of 1 to 5 the frequency of various 
student disciplinary problems such as racial tensions, bullying, sexual 
harassment of other students, harassment of other students based on sexual 
orientation, disorder in the classroom, verbal abuse of teachers, acts of 
disrespect other than verbal abuse, gang activities, and cult or extremist 
group activities.
224
 I recoded the scale so that higher values indicated 
greater frequency and then computed the mean value of the principals’ 
responses.  
I also took into account the principals’ perceptions of the level of crime 
near their schools.
225
 The 2009–2010 SSOCS asked principals to rate the 
level of crime in the geographic area of their schools on a scale of 1 to 3 
(high, moderate, or low).
226
 I recoded the principals’ responses so that a 
higher number indicated a higher level of crime. 
In addition, I included student demographics that are consistent with 
student marginalization,
227
 such as the school’s student minority 
population
228
 and student poverty level.
229
 I also included the percentage 
 
 
 221. Of course, there are other rational ways to categorize these offenses. I limited my categories 
to two for purposes of simplicity. It is important to note, however, that when I tested my models using 
different categorizations of offenses, those different categorizations did not affect the overall results of 
my empirical study.  
 222. For example, if the variable were a “1” for crimes using a weapon, that would imply that the 
school reported 1 incident for every 100 students during the school year.  
 223. See TRAVIS & COON, supra note 139, at 20; Kupchik & Ward, supra note 218; Nance, 
Students, Security, and Race, supra note 85, at 33; Welch & Payne, supra note 218, at 27.  
 224. 2009–2010 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 204, at 13.  
 225. See TRAVIS & COON, supra note 139, at 20 (observing that school crime is more common in 
schools located in crime-prone neighborhoods).  
 226. 2009–2010 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 204, at 17.  
 227. See DAVID CANTOR & MAREENA MCKINLEY WRIGHT, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., SCHOOL CRIME 
PATTERNS: A NATIONAL PROFILE OF U.S. PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOLS USING RATES OF CRIME REPORTED 
TO POLICE 8 (2002), available at https://www2.ed.gov/offices/OUS/PES/studies-school-violence/ 
school-crime-pattern.pdf (finding that large high schools located in urban areas serving a high 
percentage of minority students tend to experience more school crime); TRAVIS & COON, supra note 
139, at 20 (observing that crime is more common in schools that serve students from disadvantaged 
backgrounds); see also Kupchik & Ward, supra note 218; Nance, Students, Security, and Race, supra 
note 85, at 32–33.  
 228. NCES provided each school’s percentage of the school’s student population that consisted of 
African-Americans, Hispanics, Asian/Pacific Islanders, and American Indian/Alaska Native students. 
See SIMONE ROBERS ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. & BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY: 2011, at v 
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of students enrolled in special education, the percentage of students with 
limited English proficiency, and the percentage of students who scored in 
the bottom 15 percent on a state assessment exam.
230
 All of these 
percentages were reported by the school principals.
231
 
Further, I included other school characteristics as control variables, 
such as building level (elementary, middle, high, or combined),
232
 school 
urbanicity (urban, suburban, town, or rural),
233
 whether the school was 
non-traditional (charter school or magnet school),
234
 student population 
size,
235
 and the school’s average daily attendance rate.236 
 
 
(2012), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012002rev.pdf. Racial data for the 2009–2010 
SSOCS came from the 2007–2008 CCD school data file. See 2009–2010 RESTRICTED-USE MANUAL, 
supra note 206, at 29. Although there was a two-year difference, it is unlikely that a school would 
undergo a major shift in student demographics over a two-year period.  
 229. To measure student poverty levels, I used the percentage of students eligible for free or 
reduced-price lunch, which is a commonly used proxy. See, e.g., Michael Heise, Litigated Learning, 
Law’s Limits, and Urban School Reform Challenges, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1419, 1441 (2007) (using 
student eligibility for free and reduced-price lunch as a proxy for student poverty); Federal School 
Nutrition Programs, NEW AM. FOUND., http://febp.newamerica.net/background-analysis/federal-
school-nutrition-programs (last updated June 5, 2015) (“Researchers often use free or reduced-price 
lunch (FRPL) enrollment figures as a proxy for poverty at the school level, because Census poverty 
data (which is used at the state and district level) is not available disaggregated below the school 
district level and is not collected annually.”). Principals were asked to report the percentage of their 
current students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch. 2009–2010 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra 
note 204, at 16.  
 230. See Kupchik & Ward, supra note 218; Nance, Students, Security, and Race, supra note 85, at 
33.  
 231. See 2009–2010 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 204, at 16.  
 232. See CANTOR & WRIGHT, supra note 227, at 8 (finding that the schools that tended to have the 
most violence included large high schools located in urban areas). NCES categorized a school as an 
elementary school, middle school, high school, or combined school. See 2009–2010 RESTRICTED-USE 
MANUAL, supra note 206, at 28. These variables were dummy-coded, with the reference group being 
high school. Elementary schools are “schools in which the lowest grade is not higher than 3 and the 
highest grade is not higher than grade 8.” NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
CRIME, VIOLENCE, DISCIPLINE, AND SAFETY IN U.S. PUBLIC SCHOOLS: FINDINGS FROM THE SCHOOL 
SURVEY ON CRIME AND SAFETY: 2009–10 7 (2011), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2011/ 
2011320.pdf. Middle schools are “schools in which the lowest grade is not lower than grade 4 and the 
highest grade is not higher than grade 9.” Id. High schools are “schools in which the lowest grade is 
not lower than grade 9 and the highest grade is not higher than grade 12.” Id. Combined schools 
include “other combinations of grades, including K–12 schools.” Id. 
 233. See CANTOR & WRIGHT, supra note 227, at 8. NCES categorized schools as being located in 
a city, suburb, town, or rural area. See 2009–2010 RESTRICTED-USE MANUAL, supra note 206, at 47. 
These variables were dummy-coded, with “urban” as the reference group.  
 234. See 2009–2010 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 204, at 17. I categorized these variables 
into two groups: traditional schools and non-traditional schools.  
 235. See CANTOR & WRIGHT, supra note 227, at 8. Principals were asked to report their school’s 
total enrollment. 2009–2010 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 204, at 16.  
 236. Principals were asked to report the school’s average daily attendance as the percentage of 
students present at school. 2009–2010 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 204, at 17.  
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Finally, I controlled for whether a school official was statutorily 
required to report an incident to law enforcement. To do this, I located the 
statutes and regulations in each of the fifty states that mandated that 
certain incidents that occurred on school grounds be reported to the police 
during the 2009–2010 school year.237 If the statute or regulation clearly 
and unambiguously required that the incident be reported to law 
enforcement, I coded that variable as a “1.”238 If the state did not have a 
statutory reporting requirement or that requirement was unclear or 
ambiguous, I coded that variable as a “0.”239  
Because several of the continuous independent variables were 
positively skewed and may be unduly influenced by outliers, I used the 
natural logarithm of each of the continuous variables.
240
 I report the 
means, standard deviations, and ranges for each of the independent 
variables in Table 1 below.  
TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 Mean Std. Dev. Range 
SRO 
Elementary 
Middle 
High 
Combined 
Urban 
Suburban 
Town 
Rural 
Non-traditional 
Minority % (ln) 
Poverty % (ln) 
 .55 
 .26 
 .34 
 .36 
 .04 
 .27 
 .33 
 .15 
 .25 
 .08 
3.20 
3.61 
 .50 
 .44 
 .47 
 .48 
 .20 
 .44 
 .47 
 .35 
 .44 
 .28 
1.13 
 .85 
 0–1 
 0–1 
 0–1 
 0–1 
 0–1 
 0–1 
 0–1 
 0–1 
 0–1 
 0–1 
 0–4.62 
 0–4.62 
 
 
 237. See supra Part I.B. I note that I could not take into account whether a school district had a 
specific policy to report incidents to the police, as this information was not available to me. Future 
research might be targeted in this area.  
 238. For example, Nebraska requires school administrators to report to law enforcement acts of 
property damage, stealing, and unlawful possession of drugs or alcohol. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 79-267, 
79-293 (2015).  
 239. For example, Illinois requires principals to report all incidents of “intimidation” to law 
enforcement. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/34-84a.1 (2015). Because it is not clear that all threats without a 
weapon would constitute “intimidation” under the statute, I coded Illinois as a “0” under that category. 
See Part I.B for a complete list of state reporting requirements for each of the various offenses. 
 240. See Kupchik & Ward, supra note 218. I added 1 to each variable before taking its natural 
logarithm in order to maintain my 0 values. (The natural logarithm of 0 is undefined, while the natural 
logarithm of 1 is 0.). See id.   
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 Mean Std. Dev. Range 
Special Ed. % (ln) 
ESL % (ln)  
Low Test Score % (ln) 
Student Pop. (ln) 
Attendance % (ln) 
Disorder 
Weapon/Sex Offenses (ln) 
Non-Weapon/Non-Sex 
Offenses (ln) 
Neighborhood Crime  
Rob. (no weap.) Rep. Req. 
Theft Rep. Req. 
Drug Rep. Req. 
Alcohol Rep. Req. 
Vandalism Rep. Req. 
2.49 
1.49 
2.17 
6.50 
4.54 
1.89 
 .19 
 
1.35 
1.31 
 .21 
 .15 
 .70 
 .40 
 .17 
 .59 
1.25 
 .99 
 .73 
 .21 
 .50 
 .28 
  
 .79 
 .58 
 .41 
 .36 
 .46 
 .49 
 .38 
 0–4.62 
 0–4.62 
 0–4.62 
 2.08–8.38 
 1.10–4.62 
 1–4.73 
 0–2.43 
  
 0–4.16 
 1–3 
 0–1 
 0–1 
 0–1 
 0–1 
 0–1 
 
D. Models and Empirical Methodology 
I modeled the propensity of school officials to refer students to law 
enforcement for various offenses as a function of whether a police officer 
is present at the school at least once a week and the control variables. I list 
the basic form of the models and descriptions of each variable in the 
Appendix. 
I estimated all models using survey regression methods that account for 
observations’ survey sampling probabilities. Accordingly, the empirical 
results provide population-level estimates. Because the dependent 
variables were indicator variables, I employed logistic regression to fit the 
models. Logit coefficients are not easy to interpret. To facilitate their 
interpretation, I transformed the raw logit coefficients into exponentiated 
coefficients (Exp(B)), or odds ratios.
241
  
 
 
 241. The exponentiated coefficient, or “Exp(B),” estimates the change in odds of a school 
referring a student to law enforcement for the offenses listed for each one-unit increase in an 
independent variable, or, if the variable is categorical, for the alternative category. See Raymond E. 
Wright, Logistic Regression, in READING AND UNDERSTANDING MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS 217, 223 
(Laurence G. Grimm & Paul R. Yarnold eds., 1995) (“The odds ratio estimates the change in the odds 
of membership in the target group for a one-unit increase in the predictor.”). For example, if, 
hypothetically, the odds ratio for the independent variable “SRO” were 2, then the odds of a student 
being referred for a certain offense would be twice greater for schools having SROs than for schools 
not having SROs.  
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E. Results of the Empirical Analysis 
Figure 1 compares the percentage of incidents referred to law 
enforcement at schools having regular contact with SROs against that 
percentage at schools that do not have regular contact with SROs for 
various types of offenses.
242
 
FIGURE 1: PERCENTAGES OF OFFENSES REFERRED TO LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
 
  
 
 
 242. As explained in Part IV.C, I define regular contact with an SRO as having an SRO or sworn 
law enforcement officer present at the school at least once a week.  
73% 
69% 
47% 
53% 
38% 
61% 
75% 75% 
85% 
75% 
51% 
 43% 
31% 
 19% 
 26% 
 15% 
 29% 
 59% 
44% 
 73% 
 59% 
 35% 
With SROs Without SROs
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Without taking into account the control variables listed above, there are 
clear, visible differences in the rates of referral for each of the listed 
offenses,
243
 suggesting that an SRO’s weekly presence increases the 
number of students who will be involved in the justice system. Perhaps 
most glaring is that the rate of referral for lower-level offenses, such as 
fighting without using a weapon or making a threat without using a 
weapon, increases more than twofold when a school has regular contact 
with an SRO.  
Table 2 displays the results of the logistic regression model predicting 
the odds of referring students to law enforcement for each of the various 
offenses when controlling for other factors.
244
 It displays the 
exponentiated coefficient estimates, or the change in odds for each one-
unit increase in an independent variable, and whether the effects of the 
independent variables are statistically significant.  
 
 
 243. Using chi-square tests, I determined that there were significant differences between the 
referral rates for each above offense. The p-value was less than .001 for all of these tests except for 
possession of firearms, which had a p-value of less than .05. I also note that I did not include robbery 
with a weapon because schools referred all of those offenses to law enforcement independent of 
whether schools had regular contact with SROs.  
 244. The variation inflation factors (“VIF”), a common statistic to detect multicollinearity, 
indicated that multicollinearity was not an issue for the models.  
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TABLE 2: LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL PREDICTING ODDS OF 
REFERRING STUDENTS TO LAW ENFORCEMENT FOR VARIOUS OFFENSES 
(EXP(B) REPORTED)245 
 
Rob. 
w/o 
weapon 
Attack 
w/ 
weapon 
Attack 
w/o 
weapon 
Threat 
w/ 
weapon 
Threat 
w/o 
weapon 
Theft Guns Sharp 
Objects 
Drugs Alcohol Vandalism 
SRO 3.54*** 2.56* 1.38*** 1.98** 1.41*** 1.83*** 1.51 1.35** 1.89*** 1.76*** 1.53*** 
Building 
Levela            
 Elem. 0.77 0.22** 0.35*** 0.42* 0.35*** 0.52*** 0.78 0.46*** 0.61 0.33* 1.05 
 Middle 1.50 1.02 0.52*** 0.62 0.56*** 0.81*** 0.33* 0.81* 1.38*** 1.26 0.75*** 
 Combined 1.30 0.23 0.72*** 1.18 1.05 1.97*** 3.80 0.78 0.57*** 1.10 0.56*** 
Urbanicityb            
 Suburb. 2.05** 1.54 1.11*** 1.42 1.01 1.00 1.64 1.22* 1.27*** 1.02 1.27*** 
 Town 1.21 3.39 1.27*** 2.25* 1.05 1.63*** 4.05* 1.32* 2.59*** 1.10 1.58*** 
 Rural 1.34 3.76* 1.07 1.82 1.13* 1.35*** 2.60 1.22 1.09 2.15*** 1.29** 
Non-
traditional 2.52** 0.70 0.78*** 1.64 1.42*** 1.01 1.74 0.99 1.59*** 1.36* 1.30** 
Minority % 
(ln) 0.55** 0.69 1.00 0.93 0.97 0.96 0.91 1.08 0.97 0.80*** 0.96 
Poverty % 
(ln) 1.47* 0.93 1.05* 0.87 1.01 1.08** 0.89 0.99 1.00 0.88 0.92* 
Attendance 
% (ln) 1.59 0.07 2.94*** 1.10 1.35 1.27 0.36 0.73 2.16*** 1.19 1.15 
Special Ed. 
% (ln) 0.86 2.70* 0.92*** 1.06 0.98 0.94* 1.56 1.12 1.48*** 1.20* 1.11* 
LEP % (ln) 1.04 1.58** 0.97** 1.13 1.11*** 1.03 0.82 1.10* 0.94* 1.07 1.01 
Low Test 
Score % (ln) 1.07 1.60* 1.11*** 0.99 0.98 0.99 1.23 1.07 1.05 1.18*** 1.00 
Student Pop. 
(ln) 0.92 3.69** 1.15*** 0.92 1.05 1.19*** 1.41 1.25** 1.09 1.47*** 1.03 
Disorder 0.99 0.87 1.03 1.51* 0.96 1.08* 2.27* 1.01 1.10 1.07 1.05 
Neigh. 
Crime 1.21 3.88** 1.06** 1.42* 1.05 0.99 2.27** 1.25** 0.99 1.26** 1.12** 
Weapon/Sex 
Offenses 
(ln) 1.62* 0.28*** 1.33*** 0.20*** 0.94 1.02 0.90 0.86 1.29** 1.35* 1.35*** 
Non-
Weapon/ 
Non- Sex 
Offenses 
(ln) 0.72* 1.72* 0.80*** 1.35 0.88*** 0.84*** 0.87 1.04 0.92 1.02 0.73*** 
Rep. Req. 1.39 n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.13* n/a n/a 0.83** 0.84* 1.02 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
a. High schools were the comparison group. 
b. Urban schools were the comparison group.  
 
 
 245. The sample sizes for each of the offenses are as follows: robbery without a weapon (n=840); 
attack with a weapon (n=430); attack without a weapon (n=35,960); threat with a weapon (n=980); 
threat without a weapon (n=19,490); theft (n=17,530); firearm possession (n=250); sharp object 
possession (n=3,740); drug possession (n=9,620); alcohol possession (n=3,410); and vandalism 
(n=8,940). In accordance with guidelines for presenting results from the restricted-use SSOCS 
database, raw sample numbers are rounded to the nearest ten. See RESTRICTED-USE DATA 
PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 210, at 20. 
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All of the models but one demonstrate that having regular contact with 
an SRO is predictive of greater odds that school officials refer students to 
law enforcement for committing various offenses. This is true even after 
controlling for other important factors that may influence a school’s 
decision to refer a student to law enforcement, such as having a state 
statute that requires referral for committing a certain offense, general 
levels of criminal activity and disorder in the school, and the general level 
of crime in the neighborhood in which the school resides. This relationship 
is present for various serious offenses, such as attacks using a weapon and 
threats with a weapon. But of more concern, this relationship exists for 
lower-level offenses as well, such as fighting without a weapon, threats 
without a weapon, theft, and vandalism. In fact, the odds of referring a 
student to law enforcement for these lower-level offenses are between 1.38 
and 1.83 times greater for schools that have regular contact with SROs 
than for schools that do not. For other non-weapon offenses, such as 
robbery without a weapon, drug offenses, and alcohol offenses, the odds 
of referral increase by 3.54, 1.89, and 1.76, respectively.  
Although I included the other independent variables as control 
variables, the empirical analysis reveals other noteworthy relationships, 
some of which are expected, but others more interesting. For example, one 
interesting finding is that the number of weapon/sex offenses in a school 
generally is a strong positive predictor of greater odds of referring students 
to law enforcement for several types of offenses, including several lower-
level offenses, except in two instances (attack with a weapon and threat 
with a weapon) where there were strong negative relationships.
246
 While 
more study is needed to explore this trend, this may be evidence that many 
schools do indeed embrace the “broken windows” disciplinary model. The 
“broken windows” theory suggests that failure to respond to minor 
infractions will lead to more serious infractions, in the same way that a 
single broken window in an abandoned building will attract more 
vandalism in that building.
247
 This empirical analysis shows that higher 
rates of serious crimes are related to increased odds of referrals to law 
enforcement for lower-level offenses, perhaps because some schools 
believe that they can regain control of their schools by responding to 
lower-level offenses with a heavy hand.  
 
 
 246. An odds ratio less than 1 signals a negative relationship between the independent and 
dependent variables.  
 247. See supra note 220.  
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The strong negative relationships that exist between the rate of 
weapon/sex offenses and the odds of referral for attack with a weapon and 
threat with a weapon are also interesting. Because causality and temporal 
order cannot be detected from the data, one cannot say that higher referral 
rates to law enforcement caused the rate of those offenses to decline, or 
that higher rates of those offenses caused the referral rates to decline, or 
whether no causal relationship exists at all. More study is needed to further 
explore this trend. Nevertheless, while the reasons for these negative 
relationships are not clear, a possible explanation is that school officials 
cooperating with law enforcement are very strategic regarding which 
incidents or students they will refer to law enforcement, perhaps because 
school officials believe that not all of these incidents justify law 
enforcement involvement, they want to avoid the bad publicity that may 
come from referring high numbers of students to law enforcement for 
committing serious crimes, or because they believe that law enforcement 
will not cooperate with them if they refer too many students for 
processing. 
Likewise, the rate of non-weapon/non-sex offenses a school 
experiences is also associated with reduced odds that school officials refer 
students to law enforcement for most offenses. Again, causal relationships 
and temporal order cannot be detected from this dataset. Nevertheless, 
similar to the explanation above, it is possible that many school officials 
who cooperate with law enforcement may realize that they cannot refer 
large numbers of students to law enforcement for lower-level offenses 
because law enforcement may not appreciate or be able to handle these 
high numbers, which could cause tension between these entities. Thus, 
again, perhaps school officials are being strategic regarding which 
incidents or students they refer to law enforcement for these lower-level 
violations. 
Other control variables also proved to be related to the odds of 
referring students to law enforcement for committing certain offenses. For 
example, high schools are more likely than middle schools, elementary 
schools, or combined schools to refer students to law enforcement for 
committing many of the listed offenses. The one exception is that middle 
schools are more likely than high schools to refer students to law 
enforcement for drug offenses. In addition, schools located in suburbs, 
towns, and rural areas are generally more likely than schools located in 
urban areas to refer students to law enforcement for commtting various 
offenses when controlling for all the other listed variables. This weakens 
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support for the theory that only urban schools invoke heavy-handed, 
justice-oriented measures to discipline children.
248
 Further, the data 
suggest that non-traditional schools, such as charter schools and magnet 
schools, are more likely to refer students to law enforcement for certain 
violations, such as robbery without a weapon, threats without weapons, 
vandalism, drugs, and alcohol, but less likely to refer students for fighting 
without a weapon. 
As expected, student population predicts increased odds of referring 
students to law enforcement for several types of offenses. This suggests 
that schools with large student populations may lack the resources to 
address disciplinary problems using pedagogically sound methods.
249
 
Large schools may not have adequate resources to hire additional support, 
such as teachers, counselors, school psychologists, and behavioral 
specialists, or to implement alternative programs described below.
250
 Also 
as expected, neighborhood crime is a positive predictor. That is, school 
officials’ perceptions of crime in the neighborhood in which the school 
resides is associated with greater odds of referring students to law 
enforcement for committing certain offenses. Likewise, for many types of 
offenses, school disorder predicts increased odds of referral to law 
enforcement.  
Another positive predictor, albeit a weak one, is the percentage of 
students in the school with low test scores. Again, because causal 
relationships and temporal order cannot be detected from this dataset, one 
cannot discern whether referring more students to law enforcement had a 
negative impact on the learning environment, whether school officials 
referred students to law enforcement in an effort to push low-performing 
students out of school, or whether no causal relationship exists at all. 
Nevertheless, with respect to at least some types of offenses, the 
percentage of low-scoring test takers in the school relates positively (albeit 
weakly) to greater odds of referring students to law enforcement. 
Other independent variables, including several student demographic 
variables, have mixed relationships. For example, the percentage of 
students qualifying for free or reduced-price lunch is positively related to 
the odds of referral for three non-weapon offenses (robbery without a 
 
 
 248. These empirical findings are consistent with the observational findings of Professor Aaron 
Kupchik, who maintains that harsh disciplinary practices that were once used principally by schools 
serving primarily low-income minority students are now used in white middle-class schools as well. 
See Aaron Kupchik, Things Are Tough All Over: Race, Ethnicity, Class and School Discipline, 11 
PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 291, 291–92 (2009); see also KUPCHIK, supra note 158, at 161. 
 249. See supra Part I.E.  
 250. See infra Part V. 
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weapon, attack without a weapon, and theft), but negatively related to the 
odds of referral for vandalism. The results for the percentage of students 
enrolled in special education are also mixed. For instance, it is positively 
related to the odds of referral for attacks involving a weapon and for drug-
related offenses, which may be legally permissible reasons for temporarily 
removing students from school who qualify for special services under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”).251 But this variable 
is negatively related to the odds of referral for two lower-level offenses 
(attack without a weapon and theft), which is also consistent with the 
IDEA, because students who qualify under the IDEA receive special 
protections from removals for longer than ten days.
252
 
Surprisingly, the percentage of minority students a school serves 
generally is insignificant with respect to all of the offenses except two, 
where it is a negative predictor (robbery without a weapon and alcohol 
offenses). While this may seem inconsistent with prior research indicating 
that students of color are affected disproportionately at every stage of the 
Pipeline, I emphasize that these data do not allow researchers to examine 
the race or ethnicity of the individual students who were actually referred 
to law enforcement. Accordingly, it is entirely possible that the students 
referred to law enforcement were disproportionately students of color. 
More research must be conducted in this area to detect this important 
relationship.  
Finally, it is important to note that the reporting statutes are 
insignificant predictors of the odds of referring students to law 
enforcement for robbery without a weapon and vandalism, although they 
are weakly associated in a positive fashion with the odds of referring 
students for theft. Curiously, the reporting statutes are negative predictors 
of the odds of referring students for drug- and alcohol-related offenses. 
Overall, these trends suggest that the reporting statutes do not appear to be 
a driving force behind referrals to law enforcement, perhaps because they 
are not enforced or because school officials are unaware of them.
253
  
 
 
 251. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(G) (2014) (allowing school officials to remove students to an 
interim educational setting for up to forty-five days when a student brings a weapon or drugs to 
school). 
 252. See id. § 1415(j). Furthermore, because suspending special education students is often 
viewed as complex and rife with litigation, school officials may be hesitant to refer special education 
students for any offenses that do not involve weapons or drugs, even if removal would be for less than 
ten days.  
 253. It should be emphasized again that many school districts have reporting policies that may 
have a measurable effect on referral rates, but could not be taken into account in this study. 
Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that because these policies most likely are formed by 
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F. Limitations of the Empirical Study 
A brief explanation of the limitations of this study is warranted. One 
limitation is that the data do not allow researchers to categorically 
conclude that having regular contact with SROs causes a school to refer a 
student to law enforcement for committing an offense. To better assess the 
impact of SROs on a school, one would need to collect observational data 
on referrals to law enforcement during a period when a school did not 
have regular contact with an SRO (the control period) and after that school 
had regular contact with an SRO (the treatment period).
254
 Further, 
observing the incidents as they occur (or at least interviewing witnesses 
who observed them) rather than relying on written, generic descriptions of 
the offenses is important to determine if there were other contextual 
reasons that might explain why one student was referred to law 
enforcement but another was not for the same offense category. The 
findings of this empirical study should justify a significant investment of 
resources to conduct such a study in several schools in several different 
types of settings before our nation invests more funds in these costly SRO 
programs.  
Another limitation of this study is that it is not clear exactly how the 
school official respondents interpreted the question asking them to record 
the total number of incidents “reported to police or other law 
enforcement.”255 The survey question suggests that school officials should 
record the total number of students that the school officials themselves 
referred to law enforcement. But it also seems plausible that school 
officials included in that report the number of arrests that SROs made 
while on duty in the school. This is a section of the 2009–2010 SSOCS 
Questionnaire that the US Department of Education might consider 
redrafting to reduce ambiguity. It is also an area for further scholarly 
research. But this ambiguity does not weaken the importance of these 
findings—that having regular contact with an SRO is predictive of greater 
odds that students will be referred to law enforcement for committing 
offenses, even lower-level offenses. Nevertheless, in future studies, it is 
important to distinguish exactly how the student was referred to law 
enforcement so reformers have a better sense of where they can direct their 
resources to institute change.    
 
 
school boards or district officials, school officials have greater influence over changing these policies 
than state or federal reporting statutes.  
 254. See JAMES & MCCALLION, supra note 37, at 9. 
 255. See 2009–2010 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 204, at 11. 
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A third limitation of this study is that the data do not contain 
information regarding what happened to the students after they were 
referred to law enforcement. Most likely some students were arrested and 
convicted, some were arrested but not convicted, and many were released 
without an arrest. More study is needed in this area as well, because an 
arrest is more detrimental than a referral, and a conviction is far worse 
than an arrest or a referral. In addition, more research is needed to identify 
the types of offenses and the conditions under which a referral to law 
enforcement ultimately leads to an arrest and a conviction. Nevertheless, it 
is important to emphasize that whenever a student is referred to law 
enforcement, whatever the outcome is, it most likely changes that 
student’s life for the worse. Even referrals can leave permanent scars and 
unresolved anger, disrupt the student’s educational process by leading to 
suspension or expulsion, lead to embarrassment and stigma among 
classmates and teachers, incite distrust and negative views towards law 
enforcement, and tax public resources.
256
  
Finally, as discussed above, a fourth limitation of this study is that the 
data do not allow researchers to examine the race or ethnicity of the 
individual students who were referred to law enforcement for the various 
offenses. Consistent with prior empirical research on student discipline 
and juvenile arrests generally,
257
 if that data were available at the national 
level, it seems likely that the data would reveal racial disparities in the 
referral rates as well.  
V. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This Part discusses the serious concerns raised by the empirical 
findings. It also proposes several measures that lawmakers and school 
officials should implement to address the concerns raised in the empirical 
study.  
A. Discussion of Empirical Findings 
Although causation cannot be determined, the results of this empirical 
study show that having regular contact with SROs is predictive of greater 
odds that school officials refer students to law enforcement for committing 
 
 
 256. See Hawker v. Sandy City Corp., 774 F.3d 1243, 1245–46 (10th Cir. 2014) (Lucero, J., 
concurring); N.C. v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.3d 852, 863–64 (Ky. 2013); KIM & GERONIMO, supra 
note 123, at 10; see also supra Part III.  
 257. See supra notes 193–200 and accompanying text. 
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various offenses. But more disturbingly, these findings suggest that regular 
contact with SROs is related to increased odds of referring students to law 
enforcement for lower-level offenses that school administrators and 
teachers should address themselves using pedagogically sound disciplinary 
methods. The results hold true across many types of schools in many types 
of settings, even after controlling for variables such as state statutes 
mandating referral to law enforcement, general levels of criminal activity 
and disorder, neighborhood crime, and other demographic variables. 
Importantly, these findings are consistent with prior studies also 
suggesting that schools with SROs were more likely to report students to 
law enforcement for lower-level offenses than schools without SROs, 
although both of those studies relied on older datasets and employed 
different models.
258
  
The reasons why schools that have regular contact with SROs are more 
likely to refer students to law enforcement are not clear from this dataset 
and require further study. Nevertheless, it seems to be a logical outcome. 
When school officials and SROs develop working relationships with one 
another, it is reasonable to assume that SROs encourage school officials to 
refer students to law enforcement for offenses that in the past the school 
officials handled internally. Along those same lines, perhaps when SROs 
have a consistent presence at the school, some teachers and school 
officials summon police officers already patrolling the school hallways to 
handle a classroom disturbance out of convenience or because it becomes 
an expectation among school officials, teachers, and parents. In addition, 
once school officials and SROs establish regular patterns of 
communication, school officials might rely on SROs as legal consultants. 
That is, when a student commits an offense, it is possible that school 
officials seek advice from SROs regarding whether that offense should be 
reported to law enforcement for processing because they trust that SROs 
understand the law better than they do.
259
 Further, some school officials 
might use SROs as cover when they seek to evade the responsibility of 
working with challenging students by turning those students over to law 
enforcement. When confronted by angry parents or other community 
members, school officials can respond that the SROs told them that they 
should refer a student to law enforcement for processing.  
 
 
 258. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.  
 259. This pattern was observed by Professor Aaron Kupchik in his ethnographical study of four 
high schools. See KUPCHIK, supra note 158, at 95 (“The principals at the schools I studied each rely on 
their officer as a legal adviser of sorts.”).  
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Regardless of the reasons behind this relationship, these findings 
should raise serious concerns regarding our nation’s SRO programs. These 
data support the conclusion that a school’s regular contact with SROs 
leads school officials to redefine lower-level offenses as criminal justice 
issues rather than as social or psychological issues that they can address 
using more pedagogically sound disciplinary methods or employing 
mental health treatments.
260
 In other words, SRO programs appear to 
facilitate a criminal justice orientation to how school officials respond to 
offenses that they once handled internally.
261
  
A logical extension of these findings is that, as more funding becomes 
available to schools to hire more SROs through post-Newtown legislation, 
more students may be referred to law enforcement (either by way of 
school officials or the SROs themselves), and that more students may be 
arrested and, possibly, convicted. As described above, the consequences of 
involving students in the criminal justice system are severe and have 
lasting, negative impacts on the students themselves and society at 
large.
262
 Indeed, what is so disturbing about these findings is that despite 
multiple empirical studies suggesting that more law enforcement in 
schools leads to more student involvement in the criminal justice system, 
lawmakers and school officials continue to propose the same solutions and 
rely on the same methods to enhance school safety in the wake of high-
profile acts of school violence. 
Some may argue that the safety of our children in schools is 
paramount, which is all the justification needed for funding SRO 
programs. The safety of children in schools is extremely important. No 
one can plausibly argue otherwise. However, one must also remember that 
the current research on the effectiveness of SRO programs in preventing 
violence is very limited.
263
 In addition, SROs and other strict security 
measures simply do not and cannot prevent all acts of violence from 
occurring in schools. For example, in a Washington, DC, school that had 
metal detectors, a student was shot by another student inside the school, 
and a shooting also took place in a Red Lake, Minnesota, school with 
metal detectors, perimeter fencing, and guards.
264
 The Columbine 
 
 
 260. See id. at 115. 
 261. See id. 
 262. See supra Part III. 
 263. See supra Part II. 
 264. Sara Neufeld & Sumathi Reddy, Violent Week Renews Metal Detector Debate, BALT. SUN 
(Oct. 14, 2006), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2006-10-14/news/0610140131_1_metal-detectors-
school-students-park-elementary-school. 
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massacre also occurred in a school that used metal detectors and employed 
guards.
265
 But far more importantly, even if SROs and other strict 
measures do deter some from bringing weapons to schools, these measures 
do not support long-term solutions to help students develop socially 
responsible behavior, understand collective responsibility, and resolve 
conflict peacefully.
266
 Rather, reliance on these strict measures may 
exacerbate underlying tensions by creating adversity and mistrust within 
the school climate.
267
 Furthermore, investing millions of dollars in SROs 
and other security equipment diverts scarce resources away from 
pedagogically sound methods to improve school safety that enhance the 
learning environment.
268
 And while these alternative methods may not 
prevent a deranged individual from harming members of the school 
community, it should not be forgotten how rare these Newtown-like events 
are.
269
 Schools still remain among the safest places for children 
generally.
270
 As Professor Aaron Kupchik observes, “I find that the 
presence of police in schools is unlikely to prevent another school 
shooting, and that the potential for oppression of students—especially 
poor and racial/ethnic minority youth—is a more realistic and far more 
common threat.”271 
B. Recommendations  
It is critical to recognize that there are better, more pedagogically 
sound methods to address school violence and help students maximize the 
educational opportunities available to them. For example, rather than 
spending exorbitant amounts of money hiring SROs and installing other 
strict security measures to promote school safety, we should use our 
resources to provide students with more mentoring programs; counselors; 
mental health services; programs that build a strong sense of community, 
character, collective responsibility, and trust; and programs that help 
students develop anger-management skills and teach students how to 
 
 
 265. Amanda Terkel, Columbine High School Had Armed Guard During Massacre in 1999, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 23, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/21/columbine-armed-
guards_n_2347096.html; Marcus Wright, Experts Say Intrusive Security at Public Schools Reproduces 
Social Inequality, MICH. CITIZEN (Nov. 15, 2012), http://michigancitizen.com/dps-eaa-tighten-
security/.  
 266. See Nance, Students, Security, and Race, supra note 85, at 24.  
 267. Id.; see also supra notes 144–45 and accompanying text.  
 268. See Nance, Students, Security, and Race, supra note 85, at 24.  
 269. Scott, supra note 54, at 541 (observing that serious acts of school violence are rare). 
 270. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.  
 271. KUPCHIK, supra note 158, at 82.  
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resolve conflict.
272
 In fact, there are many alternative methods that 
enhance school safety more effectively than implementing measures that 
rely on coercion and fear.
273
 Indeed, school safety experts and educators 
have long recognized that creating a safe environment depends largely on 
creating a positive school climate based on trust, respect, and open 
communication among members of the school community.
274
  
Perhaps the most effective way to enhance school safety is to improve 
the quality and strength of educators’ teaching and classroom-management 
skills.
275
 When teachers have well-planned lessons, employ a varied 
instructional approach that includes hands-on learning activities to target 
different learning styles and student needs, establish clear behavioral 
expectations, and help students understand how the material is useful, 
teachers engage students and behavioral problems dissipate.
276
 An 
educational experience such as this provides students with a sense of 
commitment, personal responsibility, and purpose.
277
 Students want to be 
in the classroom and fully participate in the educational experience offered 
to them. They feel that the educational process will work for them if they 
commit themselves and establish positive relationships with other 
members of the school community.
278
 
 
 
 272. See Nance, Random, Suspicionless Searches, supra note 85, at 400–01; Nance, Students, 
Security, and Race, supra note 85, at 48–55.  
 273. See Nance, Students, Security, and Race, supra note 85, at 48–55; see also generally 
GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 64. While I will introduce the alternative programs and strategies 
here, I provide much greater detail in a forthcoming article. See Nance, Dismantling the School-to-
Prison Pipeline, supra note 16.  
 274. GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 64, at 5 (maintaining that positive school climates can 
enhance school safety); see also ROBERT A. FEIN ET AL., U.S. SECRET SERV. & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS: A GUIDE TO MANAGING THREATENING SITUATIONS AND TO 
CREATING SAFE SCHOOL CLIMATES 11 (2004) (“In educational settings that support climates of safety, 
adults and students respect each other. A safe school environment offers positive personal role models 
in its faculty. It provides a place for open discussion where diversity and differences are respected; 
communication between adults and students is encouraged and supported; and conflict is managed and 
mediated constructively.”).  
 275. See DANIEL J. LOSEN & JONATHAN GILLESPIE, CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, OPPORTUNITIES 
SUSPENDED: THE DISPARATE IMPACT OF DISCIPLINARY EXCLUSION FROM SCHOOL 32 (2012), 
available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/resources/projects/center-for-civil-rights-remedies/ 
school-to-prison-folder/federal-reports/upcoming-ccrr-research/losen-gillespie-opportunity-suspended-
2012.pdf; Nance, Dismantling the School-to-Prison Pipeline, supra note 16; see also MICHAEL 
ESKENAZI ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR SCHS. & CMTYS., FORDHAM UNIV., EQUITY OR EXCLUSION: THE 
DYNAMICS OF RESOURCES, DEMOGRAPHICS, AND BEHAVIOR IN THE NEW YORK CITY PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS 2 (2003) (observing that teacher qualifications have a strong positive effect on student 
behavior); Nance, Students, Security, and Race, supra note 85, at 53. 
 276. See LOSEN & GILLESPIE, supra note 275, at 36; FEDDERS ET AL., supra note 41, at 8; see also 
Nance, Students, Security, and Race, supra note 85, at 53. 
 277. See Nance, Students, Security, and Race, supra note 85, at 53. 
 278. See Nance, Dismantling the School-to-Prison Pipeline, supra note 16; Nance, Students, 
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In connection with improving teaching quality, another effective 
initiative to improve school safety and discipline is School-Wide Positive 
Behavioral Interventions and Supports (“SWPBIS”).279 It is a data-driven 
initiative that provides educators and students with strategies to define, 
teach, model, and support appropriate behavior that helps create an 
optimal learning climate.
280
 SWPBIS sets out a decision-making 
framework to help educators choose and implement evidence-based 
practices, develop a set of behavior interventions and supports, use data to 
address school issues, and create environments to prevent behavioral 
problems from developing.
281
 This program has been successful in 
promoting school safety in many types of settings, including in schools 
within the juvenile justice system.
282
 In fact, several studies empirically 
demonstrate substantial improvement in student behavior, school climate, 
and overall academic achievement when schools implement the SWPBIS 
program.
283
 
 
 
Security, and Race, supra note 85, at 53. 
 279. See Nance, Dismantling the School-to-Prison Pipeline, supra note 16; Nance, Students, 
Security, and Race, supra note 85, at 50–51.  
 280. See POSITIVE BEHAV. INTERVENTIONS & SUPPORTS, http://www.pbis.org/ (last visited Jan. 9, 
2016); FEDDERS ET AL., supra note 41, at 8 (recommending SWPBIS as a proven means to improve 
student safety); OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED, supra note 67, at 35 (recommending SWPBIS as a 
method for improving the learning environment); Catherine P. Bradshaw et al., Altering School 
Climate Through School-Wide Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports: Findings from a 
Group-Randomized Effectiveness Trial, 10 PREVENTION SCI. 100, 100 (2009) (finding improved 
organizational health and safety in schools that implemented SWPBIS); Matthew J. Mayer & Peter E. 
Leone, School Violence and Disruption Revisited: Equity and Safety in the School House, FOCUS ON 
EXCEPTIONAL CHILD., Sept. 2007, at 13 (observing that SWPBIS can “transform[] the school 
environment to support overall student success, behaviorally, socially, and academically”); Nance, 
Students, Security, and Race, supra note 85, at 50–51.  
 281. See PBIS Frequently Asked Questions, POSITIVE BEHAV. INTERVENTIONS & SUPPORTS, 
http://www.pbis.org/school/swpbis-for-beginners/pbis-faqs (last visited Dec. 12, 2014); Nance, 
Students, Security, and Race, supra note 85, at 50–51. 
 282. Nance, Students, Security, and Race, supra note 85, at 50–51; see also David Domenici & 
James Forman Jr., What it Takes to Transform a School Inside a Juvenile Justice Facility: The Story of 
the Maya Angelou Academy, in JUSTICE FOR KIDS, supra note 27, at 283, 290 (successfully using a 
modified version of SWPBIS in a school inside a juvenile justice facility to improve student behavior).  
 283. See, e.g., Cynthia M. Anderson & Donald Kincaid, Applying Behavior Analysis to School 
Violence and Discipline Problems: Schoolwide Positive Behavior Support, 28 BEHAV. ANALYST 49, 
57–58 (2005) (describing several empirical studies that demonstrate improvements in student behavior 
and school climate); James K. Luiselli et al., Whole-School Positive Behaviour Support: Effects on 
Student Discipline Problems and Academic Performance, 25 EDUC. PSYCHOL. 183 (2005) (empirically 
demonstrating improvements in student behavior and academic achievement after implementing 
SWPBIS).  
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Yet another effective practice for reducing school violence is 
restorative justice.
284
 Restorative justice initiatives are dispute resolution-
based tools that seek to reconcile offenders and victims.
285
 It focuses on 
“repairing the harm, engaging victims, establishing accountability, 
developing a community, and preventing future actions.”286 Schools can 
employ a variety of restorative practices ranging from on-the-spot 
responses to misbehavior to community conferencing involving parents, 
students, and teachers.
287
 During conferences, victims share with offenders 
how they have been harmed, and offenders are given the opportunity to 
apologize and make amends.
288
 This practice teaches students to share 
feelings, which can humanize the victims and transform the dynamics of 
the relationship to prevent further wrongdoing.
289
 As with SWPBIS, 
schools that have implemented restorative justice practices have improved 
school safety and student discipline. For example, after the first year of 
implementation, West Philadelphia High School, once known as one of 
Philadelphia’s most dangerous schools, experienced a decrease in violent 
offenses by 52%.
290
 After the second year of implementation, violence 
incidents decreased by an additional 40%.
291
 Several other schools 
implementing restorative justice practices likewise have significantly 
improved student behavior.
292
 SWPBIS and restorative justice initiatives 
are but a few of the many programs and initiatives available to school 
officials to enhance school safety while strengthening the learning 
climate.
293
 
 
 
 284. See Nance, Dismantling the School-to-Prison Pipeline, supra note 16; Nance, Students, 
Security, and Race, supra note 85, at 51–53. Notably, schools can employ restorative justice initiatives 
in conjunction with other programs such as SWPBIS.  
 285. See UDI OFER ET AL., ANNENBERG INST. FOR SCH. REFORM, BROWN UNIV., N.Y. CIVIL 
LIBERTIES UNION & MAKE THE ROAD N.Y., SAFETY WITH DIGNITY: ALTERNATIVES TO THE OVER-
POLICING OF SCHOOLS 18 (2009).  
 286. Thalia N.C. González & Benjamin Cairns, Moving Beyond Exclusion: Integrating 
Restorative Practices and Impacting School Culture in Denver Public Schools, in JUSTICE FOR KIDS, 
supra note 27, at 241. 
 287. GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 64, at 10 n.25. 
 288. See id.; see also Nance, Students, Security, and Race, supra note 85, at 51–52.  
 289. Nance, Students, Security, and Race, supra note 85, at 52.  
 290. See INT’L INST. FOR RESTORATIVE PRACTICES, IMPROVING SCHOOL CLIMATE: FINDINGS 
FROM SCHOOLS IMPLEMENTING RESTORATIVE PRACTICES 7 (2009). 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. at 9–31; see also González & Cairns, supra note 286, at 252–53 (describing the benefits 
of restorative justice).  
 293. See generally GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 64; see also LOSEN & GILLESPIE, supra note 
275, at 35–37; Nance, Students, Security, and Race, supra note 85, at 48–55; Nance, Dismantling the 
School-to-Prison Pipeline, supra note 16. 
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To be clear, I do not propose that school officials should never rely on 
SROs under any circumstances. While schools should not use SROs as a 
first-order response to address school crime and disorder, perhaps there are 
unusually dangerous environments where it would be appropriate to use 
them.
294
 If school officials decide to rely on SROs to promote school 
safety, schools should adopt the following two recommendations to 
ameliorate the ill effects of SRO programs. First, as suggested by the US 
Department of Education and the US Department of Justice, lawmakers 
and high-level school officials should provide regular training to teachers, 
principals, and SROs regarding how to support positive behavior and 
engage students without using the justice system.
295
 Included in this 
training should be an emphasis regarding equity and fairness for all 
students, particularly with respect to racial and ethnic minorities, students 
with disabilities, LGTBQ students, and other vulnerable student groups.
296
  
Second, schools relying on SROs should consider crafting written 
agreements or memoranda of understanding (“MOUs”), ideally before 
establishing an SRO program, to ensure that SROs and school officials 
understand that SROs and other law enforcement should not become 
involved in routine discipline matters.
297
 There may be philosophical 
differences between school officials and SROs that must be addressed 
before SROs begin working inside schools.
298
 Thus, MOUs should clearly 
delineate all actors’ roles and responsibilities.299 A report that evaluated 
 
 
 294. See Hirschfield & Celinska, supra note 122, at 9 (acknowledging that failing to appropriately 
respond to dangerous and disruptive students may also have an adverse effect on fear, trust, and the 
school climate). 
 295. See Statement of Interest of the United States at 13–14, S.R. v. Kenton Cnty., No. 2:15-CV-
143 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 2, 2015), 2015 WL 9462973; GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 64, at 7–8; 
FERGUSON INVESTIGATION, supra note 10, at 37–38; see also Nance, Dismantling the School-to-
Prison Pipeline, supra note 16. In fact, to receive a grant from the US Department of Justice Office of 
Community Oriented Policing Service, schools must agree that “any officers deployed . . . under the 
COPS Hiring Program grant cannot be involved in the administrative discipline of students,” OFFICE 
OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2015 COPS HIRING PROGRAM (CHP) 
APPLICATION GUIDE 27 (2015), available at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/2015AwardDocs/chp/ 
CHP_AppGuide.pdf, although it is unclear how much this provision is enforced.  
 296. See PETER FINN & JACK MCDEVITT, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF SCHOOL RESOURCE 
OFFICER PROGRAMS 44 (2005) (emphasis omitted) (recommending training for SROs and stating that 
“any delay in training can be a serious problem because SROs then have to learn their jobs by ‘sinking 
or swimming’”); GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 64, at 8; see also Statement of Interest of the United 
States, supra note 295, at 14–15. 
 297. GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 64, at 9–10; see also Statement of Interest of the United 
States, supra note 295, at 13–14; KIM & GERONIMO, supra note 123, at 12–13. 
 298. JAMES & MCCALLION, supra note 37, at 11.  
 299. Id.; see also FERGUSON INVESTIGATION, supra note 10, at 37 (criticizing the MOU between 
the Ferguson Police Department and the Ferguson school district because the agreement “does not 
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nineteen SRO programs stated that “[w]hen SRO programs fail to define 
the SROs’ roles and responsibilities in detail before—or even after—the 
officers take up their posts in the schools, problems are often rampant—
and often last for months and even years.”300 The US Department of 
Education, the American Civil Liberties Union, the Congressional 
Research Service, the National Association for School Resource Officers, 
the US Department of Justice, and several states all support the use of 
MOUs if schools use SROs.
301
 
CONCLUSION 
The terrible shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary School have caused 
our nation to deeply consider violence, student safety, SROs, and other 
security measures in schools. A natural response to these shootings is to 
bolster school security by assigning more police officers to schools to 
protect students. However, this strategy may be short-sighted and deeply 
misguided. It is an expensive and unproven tactic, and the rarity of 
Newtown-like events alone suggests that our nation should use our limited 
resources to aid students in other ways, especially when we acknowledge 
that it is impossible to protect students at all times and in all places. But 
the empirical research set forth here provides further justification for 
reconsidering the decision of many to invest in more SRO programs. A 
police officer’s regular presence at a school is predictive of greater odds 
that school officals refer students to law enforcement for committing 
various offenses, including lower-level offenses that school officials and 
teachers should handle themselves. These findings hold true even after 
controlling for state statutes that require schools to report certain incidents 
 
 
clearly define the SROs’ role or limit SRO involvement in cases of routine discipline or classroom 
management”).  
 300. PETER FINN ET AL., COMPARISON OF PROGRAM ACTIVITIES AND LESSONS LEARNED AMONG 
19 SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER (SRO) PROGRAMS 2 (2005). 
 301. See IND. CODE § 20-26-18.2-2 (2015); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 26-102 (West 2015); TEX. 
EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.0021 (West 2015); GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 64, at 9–10; JAMES & 
MCCALLION, supra note 37, at 11–12; KIM & GERONIMO, supra note 123, at 12–13; RAYMOND, supra 
note 122, at 30 (“An operating protocol or memorandum of understanding is a critical element of an 
effective school-police partnership.”); Thurau & Wald, supra note 93, at 991 (“[T]he National 
Association of School Resource Officers (‘NASRO’) strongly recommends the use of MOUs.”). 
Pennsylvania has several fairly thorough regulations in regard to memoranda of understanding 
between police departments and schools. See 22 PA. CODE § 10.1 (2012) (setting forth the state’s 
intent to “maintain a cooperative relationship between school entities and local police departments”); 
id. § 10.2 (defining “memorandum of understanding”); id. § 10.11 (requiring each school administrator 
to “execute and update, on a biennial basis, a memorandum of understanding with each local police 
department having jurisdiction over school property of the school entity”); id. app. A (providing a 
model memorandum of understanding).  
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to law enforcement, general levels of criminal activity and disorder, 
neighborhood crime, and other demographic variables.  
When one considers the devastating impact the justice system can have 
on youth, it is easy to see that changes are necessary.
302
 It is imperative for 
all of us to understand that there are better ways to discipline students, 
address school violence, and meet students’ needs. As the US Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently observed:  
[T]housands of [students] . . . thrust into the criminal justice system 
deserve better. . . . It [is] too easy for educators to shed their 
significant and important role in [the disciplinary] process and 
delegate it to the police and courts. . . . A more enlightened 
approach to . . . school discipline by educators, police, and courts 
will enhance productive lives and help break the school-to-prison 
chain.
303
 
Indeed, the existence of safe, successful schools in challenging 
environments demonstrates that it is possible,
304
 and we owe it to our 
youth to give educators the resources they need to make it a reality in 
every community.  
 
 
 302. This also underscores the need for a complete overhaul of the juvenile justice system 
generally, so that the system is more responsive to the needs of youth, helps them become productive 
citizens, and avoids setting them on a path that leads to future involvement in the justice system. See 
generally TOTAL REFORM FOR A BROKEN SYSTEM, supra note 22. 
 303. Hawker v. Sandy City Corp., 774 F.3d 1243, 1246 (10th Cir. 2014) (Lucero, J., concurring). 
 304. See Nance, Students, Security, and Race, supra note 85, at 54–55.  
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APPENDIX 
The basic model for the empirical analysis is of the following form: 
Referrali = α + β1 * SROi + Controls + ε 
 
where:  
 
 Referrali = an indicator variable equal to 1 if school officials 
reported an offense to law enforcement and 0 otherwise.305 
 
 SROi = an indicator variable equal to 1 if the principal 
indicated that a resource officer or sworn law enforcement officer was 
present at the school at least once a week and 0 otherwise.  
 
 Control variables are as follows:  
 
 Elementaryi = a dummy variable equal to 1 for elementary 
schools and 0 otherwise.306  
 Middlei = a dummy variable equal to 1 for middle schools 
and 0 otherwise.307  
 Combinedi = a dummy variable equal to 1 for combined 
schools and 0 otherwise.308  
 Suburbani = a dummy variable equal to 1 for schools 
located in a suburban area and 0 otherwise.309  
 Towni = a dummy variable equal to 1 for schools located in 
towns and 0 otherwise.310  
 Rurali = a dummy variable equal to 1 for rural schools and 
0 otherwise.311  
 
 
 305. I conducted the analysis for each of the following offenses: robbery without a weapon, attack 
with a weapon, attack without a weapon, threat with a weapon, threat without a weapon, theft, firearm 
possession, knife possession, drug possession, alcohol possession, and vandalism.  
 306. The reference group is high schools. 
 307. The reference group is high schools. 
 308. The reference group is high schools.  
 309. The reference group is urban schools. 
 310. The reference group is urban schools.  
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 Nontraditionali = a dummy variable equal to 1 for charter or 
magnet schools and 0 otherwise.  
 Minority%(ln)i = the natural log of the proportion of 
students in the school consisting of African-Americans, 
Hispanics, Asian/Pacific Islanders, and American 
Indian/Alaska Native students.  
 Poverty%(ln)i = the natural log of the proportion of students 
in the school eligible for free or reduced-priced lunch.  
 Special Ed.%(ln)i = the natural log of the proportion of 
students in the school enrolled in special education.  
 LEP%(ln)i = the natural log of the proportion of students in 
the school who had limited English proficiency.  
 Low Test Score%(ln)i = the natural log of the proportion of 
students in the school who scored below the 15th percentile 
on standardized tests.  
 Student Pop.(ln)i = the natural log of the school’s total 
student enrollment.  
 Attendance%(ln)i = the natural log of the school’s average 
proportion of students attending school daily.  
 Disorderi = an index from 1 to 5 that reflected the frequency 
of occurrences relating to school disorder. 
 Weapon/Sex Offenses(ln)i = the natural log of the rate per 
100 students of weapon and sex offenses that occurred in 
the school.312 
  
 
 
 311. The reference group is urban schools. 
 312. “Weapon/Sex Offenses” included rape, sexual battery, robbery with a weapon, physical 
attack with a weapon, threats of physical attack with a weapon, possession of a firearm or explosive 
device, and possession of a knife or sharp object.  
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 Non-Weapon/Non-Sex Offenses(ln)i = the natural log of the 
rate per 100 students of non-weapon and non-sex offenses 
that occurred in the school.313 
 Neighborhood Crimei = the principal’s perception of crime 
problems near the school on a scale of 1 to 3. 
 Rep. Req.i = a dummy variable equal to 1 if the state in 
which the school was located had an unambiguous 
reporting statute for the offense and 0 otherwise.314 
 
 
 313. “Non-Weapon/Non-Sex Offenses” included robbery without a weapon; physical attack 
without a weapon; threats of physical attack without a weapon; theft; distribution, possession, or use of 
illegal drugs or alcohol; and vandalism.  
 314. I applied this variable to the following offenses: robbery without a weapon, theft, drugs, 
alcohol, and vandalism. I did not apply it to offenses involving weapons because all schools were 
required to have a reporting policy for any offenses involving weapons. See 20 U.S.C. § 7151 (2009). I 
also did not apply it to “physical attack or fight without a weapon” or “threat of physical attack 
without a weapon” because no state statute clearly mandaded a school to refer students to law 
enforcement for committing these offenses.  
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